SP15 mengecam beg silang (Ekshibit P21(9)(A)) tersebut sebagai beg yang dilihat oleh beliau sering dibawa oleh Perayu. [27] Berdasarkan keterangan di atas, kami bersetuju dengan dapatan HMT iaitu, keterangan ikut keadaan dalam kes ini jika diambil secara bersekali dan menyeluruh akan memberikan kesimpulan bahawa Perayu adalah orang yang telah menyebabkan kematian Simati pada tarikh kejadian. [28] Kami merujuk kepada kes Low Kian Boon v. PP [2010] 5 CLJ 489 di mana berkaitan keterangan ikut keadaan (circumstantial evidence), Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan sepertimana berikut: “[57] With regard to the question of proof mention could be made of the judicial decision in Public Prosecutor v. Wong Wai Hung & Anor [1993] 1 SLR 927, Rubin JC stated, inter alia: It is trite law that when the prosecution relies wholly on circumstantial evidence, the quantum of proof must be more than mere skeletons. The first and foremost principle to be borne in mind when approaching circumstantial evidence is set out in Idris v. PP [1960] 1 LNS 40; [1960] MLJ 296 at 297 (where Hill Ag CJ quoted with approval the trial judge's summing up to the jury and his quotation of the words of Lord Cairns in Belhaven & Stenton Peerage [1875-6] LR 1 App Cas 278 at 279): ... in dealing with circumstantial evidence we have to consider the weight which is to be given to the united force of all the circumstances put together. You may have a ray of light so feeble that by itself it will do little to elucidate a dark corner. But on the other hand, you may have number of rays, each of them insufficient, but all converging and brought to bear upon the same point, and when united, producing a body of illumination which will clear away the darkness which you are endeavouring to dispel. In other words, circumstantial evidence consists of this: that when you look at all the surrounding circumstances, you find such a series of undersigned, unexpected coincidences that, as a reasonable person, you find your judgment is compelled to one conclusion. If the circumstantial evidence is such as to fall short of that standard, if it does not satisfy that test, if it leaves gaps then it is of no use at all. As I have stated this case depends entirely upon circumstantial evidence”. (Penekanan kami) [29] Berdasarkan prinsip undang-undang mantap di atas dan atas fakta dan keterangan kes ini, kami bersetuju dengan dapatan dan keputusan HMT. Pada hemat kami keterangan ikut keadaan dalam kes ini, diambil bersekali dan secara menyeluruh adalah teramat kukuh dan melimpah ruah yang menjuruskan kepada satu kesimpulan sahaja iaitu, kecederaan dan kematian Simati sememangnya dilakukan oleh Perayu. Ketiadaan kesan DNA Perayu di tempat kejadian [30] Tidak dipertikaikan bahawa tiada kesan DNA Perayu dijumpai di tempat kejadian. Lantaran itu, peguam berhujah Pendakwaan gagal membuktikan Perayu berada di rumah Simati dan telah mencederakan Simati. HMT tidak menerima hujahan peguam tersebut. [31] Kami mendapati hujahan Perayu berkait isu ini tidak bermerit. Pada hemat kami, walaupun DNA Simati tidak dikesan di tempat kejadian, keterangan ikut keadaan lain di perenggan [26] (a) hingga (h) di atas membuktikan Perayu berada di tempat kejadian semasa kejadian, khususnya penemuan kesan DNA Simati pada beg silang milik Perayu dan cincin kepunyaan Simati di temui dalamnya. Selain penafian, Perayu gagal menjelaskan bagaimana keterangan yang begitu memudaratkan beliau tersebut boleh berada pada beg milik beliau. Pada hemat kami, kewujudan DNA Simati tersebut membuktikan Simati dan Perayu ada bersama pada masa kejadian. [32] Bagi isu ini, kami merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan Malaysia dalam kes Mohd Fazli Ismail & Satu Lagi Lwn PP [2013] 2 CLJ 467 di mana YA Ahmad Maarop, HMR menyatakan: “Pada hemat kami, ketiadaan cap jari Fazli dan Esma tidak semestinya bererti mereka tidak berada di tempat kejadian semasa pembunuhan dilakukan. Adanya cap jari di tempat kejadian adalah bukti yang positif, tetapi ketiadaan cap jari adalah tidak mencukupi untuk menyatakan bahawa orang-orang yang berkenaan tidak ada di tempat kejadian. Jadi, ketiadaan cap jari bukanlah penentu bahawa orang yang berkenaan tidak ada di tempat kejadian. Hal ini dijelaskan dalam kes Gade Lakshmi Mangraju v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 2001 SC 2677: Learned counsel alternatively contended that even if the involvement of A-2 is treated as proved that is not sufficient to inveigle the appellant into the dragnet. He said that the very fact that no fingerprint of the appellant was collected from the scene is enough to exclude his presence from the scene at the time of occurrence. Presence of fingerprint the scene of occurrence is a positive evidence but the absence of a fingerprint is not enough to foreclose the presence of the person concerned at the scene. if during perpetration of the crime the fingerprint of the culprit could possibly be remitted at the scene it is equally a possibility that such a reminant would not be remitted at all. Hence absence of finger impression is not guarantee of absence of the person concerned at the scene.” [54] Kami juga sentiasa menyedari bahawa apa yang perlu dilakukan oleh Fazli atau Esma hanyalah menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah. Keraguan yang munasabah bukanlah "an imaginary, trivial or merely possible doubt, but a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense. It must grow out of the evidence in the case" (lihat Sucha Singh v. State of Punjab [2003] Cri LJ 3876, 3883, PP v. Saimin & Ors [1971] 1 LNS 115; [1971] 2 MLJ 16, di ms. 17 per Sharma H). Dalam penghakiman kami, apa yang penting ialah sama ada terdapat keterangan lain dalam kes ini yang cukup untuk membuktikan kes terhadap Fazli dan Esma. Hal ini dijelaskan dalam Ramanathan v. State of Tamil Nadu [1978] Cri LJ 1137 SC di mana mahkamah menyatakan: It has lastly been argued that although a number of finger prints were obtained by the Investigating Officer and others, the High Court did not take into consideration the fact that those prints did not compare with the finger prints of the appellant. It has been pointed out that the High Court erred in thinking that the finger prints of Varadarajan were not obtained by the police even though the inquest report showed that the prints had been taken. It is true that the evidence on the record goes to show that a number of finger prints were obtained during the course of the investigation and it may well be that the identity of the appellant could not be established on that basis, but that could not be said to be enough to justify his acquittal when there was overwhelming evidence against him to establish his guilt.” (Penekanan kami) [33] Setelah menilai fakta dan keterangan berkaitan isu di atas, kami bersetuju dengan dapatan HMT sepenuhnya. Kami mendapati tiada sebab kukuh untuk kami mengusik dapatan HMT tersebut. Kewujudan suatu kesan DNA merupakan keterangan yang menyokong kehadiran seseorang di tempat berkenaan. Namun, ketiadaan suatu kesan tidak bermakna seseorang tiada di tempat tersebut. Oleh itu, kami bersetuju dengan dapatan HMT bahawa ketiadaan kesan DNA Perayu di tempat kejadian tidak menjejaskan kes Pendakwaan dan tidak menimbulkan keraguan munasabah terhadap kes Pendakwaan. Kewujudan kesan cap jari individu yang tidak diketahui di tempat kejadian [34] Di tempat kejadian/rumah Simati, pihak polis turut menjumpai 7 kesan cap jari milik individu yang tidak dikenalpasti. Peguam berhujah penemuan 7 kesan cap jari tersebut menunjukkan terdapat orang lain di situ dan Perayu bukanlah satu-satu orang yang berada bersama Simati. Dengan itu, peguam berhujah Pendakwaan gagal membuktikan bahawa Perayu adalah orang terakhir berada bersama Simati, bagi mengaitkan Perayu dengan kematian Simati. Peguam merujuk kepada kes PP v. Hanif Basree Abdul Rahman [2008] 4 CLJ 1. [35] HMT tidak menerima hujahan Perayu berkait isu ini. Kami juga bersetuju dengan dapatan HMT tersebut. Kami bersependapat dengan HMT tersebut. [36] Pada hemat kami, fakta kes Hanif Basree [supra] adalah tidak sama dan boleh dibezakan dengan fakta kes kita. Berbeza dari kes Hanif Basree, dalam kes kita, terdapat kesan DNA Simati pada beg silang Perayu dan juga penemuan cincin milik Simati di dalamnya. Sehubungan itu, kami sekali lagi merujuk kepada kes Mohd Fazli Ismail & Satu Lagi Lwn PP [supra] di mana YA Ahmad Maarop, HMR semasa menyentuh kes Hanif Basree menyatakan: “[55] Tidak seperti dalam kes Hanif Basree v. PP di mana terdapat banyak keterangan forensik dan keterangan lisan saksi-saksi pihak pendakwa sendiri yang menunjukkan kehadiran lelaki misteri dan/atau lelaki berbau busuk yang “in all likelihood” adalah orang terakhir yang berada dengan simati sebelum kematiannya, di dalam kes di hadapan kami keterangan SP9 membuktikan bahawa Fazli dan Esma adalah orang yang terakhir dilihat oleh SP9 semasa SP9 meninggalkan tersebut dan kami telah pun menyatakan bahawa keterangan SP9 yang disokong oleh keterangan saksi-saksi pendakwa yang lain (tanpa keterangan SP10 dan SP16 tentang pengakuan yang dikatakan telah dibuat oleh Esma dan Fazli) adalah mencukupi untuk membuktikan kes prima facie terhadap Fazli dan Esma.” [37] Berdasarkan fakta dan keadaan di atas dan berdasarkan kedudukan undang-undang mantap, kami mendapati HMT tidak ternyata terkhilaf dalam mendapati kewujudan 7 kesan cap jari tersebut tidak sedikitpun menjejaskan keterangan Pendakwaan. Prinsip "last seen together" [38] Untuk isu ini, peguam mengulangi hujahan Perayu bagi isu ketiadaan kesan DNA Perayu di tempat kejadian dan isu kewujudan kesan 7 cap jari individu yang tidak dikenali di tempat kejadian. Peguam berhujah prinsip "last seen together" tersebut tidak terpakai kerana Perayu telah berjaya menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah bahawa beliau tiada bersama Simati pada masa kejadian. Sebaliknya, TPR berhujah HMT tidak terkhilaf kerana Perayu adalah orang terakhir dilihat bersama Simati sebelum Simati dijumpai mati. TPR merujuk kepada keterangan saksi-saksi awam (SP7, SP9, SP10, SP11 dan SP13) yang diterima dan didapati sebagai kredible oleh HMT. [39] Kami bersetuju dengan hujahan TPR di atas dan dengan dapatan HMT. Kami merujuk kepada kes Salem Anak Brayon V PP [2022] 1 LNS 2917 yang dirujuk oleh TPR di mana Mahkamah memutuskan seperti berikut: “[52] Another important point was also advanced before us by the Respondent concerning the principle of the last person having been seen together with the deceased before she was discovered dead. PW17, the sole eye-witness to the incident, who was accepted by the LJ to be a credible and truthful witness testified that the Appellant was with the deceased when she left the room after the incident when the commotion stopped. Another witness, PW14, testified that she saw the Appellant leave the Deceased's room around 10.20pm. [53] Our attention was drawn to the Indian Supreme Court decision of Ashok v. State of Maharashtra [2015] 4 Supreme Court 393 where the Supreme Court of India held that: "The "last seen together" theory has been elucidated by this Court in Trimukh Marotiu Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra [2006] 10 SCC 106, in the following words: "Where an accused is alleged to have committed the murder of his wife and the prosecution succeeds in leading evidence to show that shortly before the commission of crime they were seen together or the offence takes place in the dwelling home where the husband also normally resided, it has been consistently held that if the accused does not offer an explanation how the wife received injuries or offers an explanation which is found to be false, it is a strong circumstance which indicates that he is responsible for commission of the crime. Thus, the doctrine of last seen together shifts the burden of proof on the accused, requiring him to explain how the incident had occurred. Failure on the part of the accused to furnish any explanation in this regard, would give rise to a very strong presumption against him." [54] Under the circumstances of this case where, in our view, the 'last seen together' theory applies, the burden shifted to the Appellant to proffer a strong and cogent explanation and rebut the presumption that his act or series of acts led to the Deceased's death and the inference that he committed the acts. The absence of such an explanation would be detrimental to his defence. (See Nika Ram v. State of H.P. [1972] 2 SCC 80; Kanhaiya Lal v. State of Rajasthan [2014] 4 SCC 715).” [40] Berdasarkan keseluruhan fakta kes ini, kami bersetuju dengan dapatan HMT bahawa keterangan menunjukkan Perayu adalah orang terakhir bersama Simati sebelum beliau dijumpai mati. Oleh itu, HMT tidak terkhilaf dalam menggunapakai prinsip “last seen together” terhadap Perayu. Intipati (iv) - Niat [41] Bagi intipati (iv) iaitu, niat membunuh, peguam berhujah HMT terkhilaf dalam mendapati kematian Simati terjumlah di bawah seksyen 300(a) KK berdasarkan jenis dan cara kecederaan dilakukan ke atas Simati.