Zikay Factoring Sdn Bhd v 1. ) Wd Food Group Sdn Bhd (WA-22M-1515-08/2025)

WD FOOD GROUP SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 202101018561 (1418861-M))

MOHAMAD HANIF BIN OMAR (No. K/P:950612-03-5861)

MAWAR SHERRYZAD BINTI RAFEAT (No. K/P: 910415-10-6206)

KOP LOGISTIC & DISTRIBUTION SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 199101004032 (214342-M)) ... DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN [KANDUNGAN 11 - NOTIS PERMOHONAN PLAINTIF UNTUK MENDAPAT PENGHAKIMAN TERUS TERHADAP DEFENDAN KEDUA HINGGA DEFENDAN KEEMPAT]

Plaintif ialah sebuah syarikat yang menjalankan perniagaan memberi perkhidmatan kemudahan pembaiyaan pemfaktoran atas prinsip Islamik. Plaintif telah memberikan kemudahan pemfaktoran Islamik kepada Defendan Pertama, WD Food Group Sdn Bhd di mana Defendan Kedua dan Defendan Ketiga bertindak sebagai penjamin kepada kemudahan yang diberikan oleh Plaintif kepada Defendan Pertama. Defendan Pertama memfaktorkan hasil kontrak dengan Defendan Keempat kepada Plaintif. Atas kemungkiran Defendan Pertama membuat bayaran balik, Plaintif telah memulakan tindakan ke atas kesemua Defendan. Tuntutan Plaintif ke atas Defendan Pertama telahditarik balik berikutan penggulungan syarikat Defendan Pertama. Defendan Petama hingga Defendan Keempat secara kolektif akan dirujuk sebagai “Defendan-Defendan” di dalam penghakiman ini.

Melalui Notis Permohonan di Kandungan 11, Plaintif memohon kepada Mahkamah ini untuk memasukkan penghakiman terus ke atas Defendan Kedua hingga Defendan Keempat. Pohonan (prayers) yang diminta oleh Plaintif adalah seperti berikut: a) Bahawa Plaintif diberi kebenaran dan kebebasan untuk memasukkan penghakiman terus terhadap Defendan Kedua dan Defendan Ketiga, selaku penjamin persendirian/perseorangan kepada Defendan Pertama iaitu WD Food Group Sdn Bhd secara bersesama dan/atau berasingan untuk jumlah tuntutan sebagaimana di dalam Writ Saman dan Penyataan Tuntutan, kedua-duanya bertarikh 08.08.2025, berjumlah sebanyak RM6,676,467.60 (Ringgit Malaysia Enam Juta Enam Ratus Tujuh Puluh Enam Ribu Empat Ratus Enam Tujuh dan Sen Enam Puluh Sahaja), beserta caj lewat yang dikira pada kadar 8% setahun ke atas jumlah yang terhutang dari 10.12.2024 hingga penyelesaian penuh dan muktamad. b) Bahawa Plaintif diberi kebenaran dan kebebasan untuk memasukkan penghakiman terus terhadap Defendan Keempat untuk jumlah sebagaimana di dalam Writ Saman dan Penyataan Tuntutan, keduaduanya betarikh 08.08.2025 berjumlah sebanyak RM6,676,467.60 (Ringgit Malaysia Enam Juta Enam Ratus Tujuh Puluh Enam Ribu Empat Ratus Enam Tujuh dan Sen Enam Puluh Sahaja), beserta caj lewat yang dikira pada kadar 8% setahun ke atas jumlah yang terhutang dari 10.12.2024 hingga penyelesaian penuh dan muktamad. c) Faedah pada kadar 5% setahun ke atas jumlah keseluruhan RM6,676,467.60 bermula dari tarikh penghakiman sehingga ke tarikh penyelesaian penuh dan muktamad. d) Kos tindakan dan permohonan ini; dan e) Lain-lain perintah yang difikirkan adil dan suai manfaat oleh Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini.

Pada 21.04.2026 Mahkamah ini telah membenarkan Kandungan 11 seperti dipohon ("keputusan tersebut"). Hanya Defendan Ketiga merayu ke Mahkamah Rayuan Malaysia terhadap keputusan tersebut. Alasan penghakiman ini terhad kepada rayuan Defendan Ketiga terhadap keputusan tersebut.

Perlu juga dicatitkan di sini bahawa Defendan Ketiga turut memfailkan Notis Permohonan di Kandungan 21 untuk membatalkan tindakan Plaintif ke atasnya. Kandungan 21 telah ditolak pada hari yang sama (21.04.2026). Tiada rayuan dikemukakan oleh Defendan Ketiga berkaitan keputusan Mahkamah ini menolak Kandungan 21. Oleh yang demikian, Kandungan 21 tidak akan dibincangkan di dalam penghakiman ini.

Melalui Surat Setuju Terima (eks. P-2, Kandungan 12) bertarikh 31.01.2024, Defendan Keempat telah melantik Defendan Pertama sebagai pembekal utama catuan bahan makanan mentah dan kering di bawah kontrak yang dikenali sebagai "Kontrak Perkhidmatan Pembekalan Bahan Mentah dan Kering Bagi Tempoh 24 Bulan" ("kontrak tersebut") pada harga sebanyak RM3,989,439.60 dan RM3,782,690.00 masing masingnya yang merupakan harga kontrak bulanan bagi tempoh selama dua puluh empat (24) bulan bermula pada 01.06.2024 dengan terma tempoh pembayaran kepada Defendan Pertama dalam masa empat puluh lima (45) hari.

Berdasarkan kontrak tersebut, Defendan Pertama telah membekalkan barangan kepada Defendan Keempat. Wakil Defendan Keempat telah mengakui penerimaan penghantaran barangan bahan mentah dan kering daripada Defendan Pertama dengan menurunkan tandatangan di atas Pesanan Penghantaran No. DO-0001, DO-0002 dan DO-01155 (eks. P-3, Kandungan 12). Seterusnya, Defendan Keempat telah mengeluarkan tiga (3) keping inbois masing-masingnya bernombor siri KOPLDP02024-12, KOPLDP02024-13 dan KOPLDP02024-14 yang keseluruhannya berjumlah RM7,826,467.60 (eks. P-4, Kandungan 12).

Di atas permohonan dan permintaan Defendan Pertama, Plaintif bersetuju untuk menawarkan kepada Defendan Pertama kemudahan pemfaktoran Islamik di bawah prinsip Tawarruq dan Hawalah melalui Surat Tawaran bertarikh 27.05.2024. Lanjutan daripada Surat Tawaran tersebut, Plaintif dan Defendan Pertama telah memasuki satu Perjanjian Kemudahan Pemfaktoran bertarikh 28.05.2024, di mana Defendan Pertama memindahkan kesemua hutang yang perlu dibayar oleh penghutangnya kepada Plaintif dan Plaintif menerima pemindahan hutang tersebut. Defendan Keempat telah dimaklumkan berkait dengan Perjanjian Kemudahan Pemfaktoran yang dimasuki di antara Plaintif dan Defendan Pertama (lihat Surat Tawaran dan Perjanjian Kemudahan Pemfaktoran di eks. P-5, Kandungan 12).

Bagi menjamin pembayaran di bawah Perjanjian Kemudahan Pemfaktoran tersebut, Defendan Kedua dan Defendan Ketiga telah bersetuju, secara bersesama dan berasingan, memberi jaminan persendirian/perseorangan kepada Plaintif melalui Surat Jaminan (Letter of Guarantee) Al-Kafalah bertarikh 28.05.2024 (eks. P-6, Kandungan 12) ("Surat Jaminan tersebut") dengan akujanji untuk membayar dan mengindemniti apa-apa jumlah terhutang dan terakru yang perlu dibayar kepada Plaintif sebagai penghutang prinsipal (utama) sekiranya Defendan Pertama gagal, enggan dan/atau cuai untuk melaksanakan obligasi kontraktual di bawah Perjanjian Kemudahan Pemfaktoran tersebut. Defendan Kedua dan Defendan Ketiga juga telah menandatangani Surat Akuan bertarikh 11.06.2024 di mana mereka mengakui dan mengesahkan pengetahuan penuh berkenaan fasiliti pemfaktoran yang dimasuki antara Plaintif dan Defendan Pertama (lihat eks. P-6, Kandungan 12 berkait Surat Jaminan dan Surat Akuan yang disempurnakan oleh Defendan Kedua dan Defendan Ketiga).

Melalui satu Notis Pemberitahuan Mengenai Pemfaktoran bertarikh 04.06.2024, Defendan Keempat telah dimaklumkan bahawa satu perjanjian pemfaktoran telah dimeterai di antara Plaintif dan Defendan Pertama, di mana segala bayaran bagi inbois-inbois yang dikeluarkan oleh Defendan Pertama hendaklah dibayar secara terus kepada Plaintif sebagaimana cop yang diturunkan pada setiap Pesanan Penghantaran dan inbois yang menyatakan bahawa harga barangan di dalam dokumen tersebut telah dijual dan dipindah milik kepada Plaintif dan Defendan Keempat telah mengakui penerimaan (lihat eks. P-7, Kandungan 12).

Plaintif telah membuat bayaran kepada Defendan Pertama untuk tiga (3) inbois yang dikeluarkan oleh Defendan Pertama kepada Defendan Keempat bersabit kontrak di antara Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Keempat menerusi dua (2) pembayaran berjumlah RM2,958,980.76 dan RM3,111,248.95 masing-masingnya dibuat pada 07.06.2024 dan 20.08.2024 (lihat eks. P-8, Kandungan 12).

Walaupun Defendan Keempat diberi notis oleh Defendan Pertama untuk membuat pembayaran kepada Plaintif, Defendan Keempat gagal membuat bayaran kepada Plaintif. Plaintif telah mengeluarkan Surat Peringatan bertarikh 12.09.2024 kepada Defendan Pertama serta salinannya dipanjangkan kepada Defendan Keempat, meminta pembayaran dibuat di dalam masa yang ditetapkan, dan jika gagal Plaintif akan menguatkuasakan hak-hak di bawah kontrak (lihat eks. P-9, Kandungan 12).

Berikutan dengan Surat Peringatan yang dikeluarkan oleh Plaintif. Defendan Keempat menghantar Surat Komitmen bertarikh 21.09.2024 (eks. P-10, Kandungan 12) kepada Plaintif memohon tempoh daripada Plaintif untuk menjelaskan bayaran. Defendan Keempat telah mengemukakan cadangan pembayaran berkala yang boleh diringkaskan seperti jadual berikut:

Namun begitu, tidak seperti yang dijanjikan, Defendan Keempat sekadar membayar sejumlah RM1,150,000.00 melalui tiga (3) bayaran, iaitu RM500,000.00 pada 08.10.2024, RM500,000.00 pada 01.11.2024 dan RM150,000.00 pada 09.12.2024, meninggalkan baki sebanyak RM6,676,467.60 yang masih tertunggak.

Plaintif melalui peguamcaranya telah menghantar Notis Tuntutan bertarikh 31.12.2024 kepada Defendan-Defendan, menuntut bayaran berjumlah RM6,676,467.60 (lihat eks. P-13, Kandungan 12). Lantaran tiada bayaran diterima, tindakan ini difailkan terhadap Defendan-Defendan.

Defendan Ketiga mengakui menandatangani Surat Jaminan Al-Kafalah bertarikh 28.05.2024, tetapi mendakwa tandatangan beliau telah diperoleh melalui salah nyata/pengaruh tidak wajar/tekanan kerja oleh Defendan Pertama dan/atau Defendan Kedua, serta tanpa nasihat undang-undang bebas. Defendan Ketiga juga mendakwa kandungan Surat Jaminan adalah amat berat sebelah. Defendan Ketiga adalah pekerja Defendan Pertama yang menurut arahan. Defendan Ketiga mendakwa beliau telah dijanjikan dengan kemajuan kerjaya sebagai balasan menjadi penjamin kepada kemudahan yang diberikan oleh Plaintif kepada Defendan Pertama.

Selanjutnya, Defendan Ketiga menyatakan bahawa beliau bukan benefisiari kepada apa-apa kemudahan yang diberi oleh Plaintif dan tidak menerima sebarang manfaat/faedah daripadanya. Juga, Defendan Ketiga mengatakan tiada bukti beliau diberi kuasa oleh Defendan Pertama untuk menjadi penjamin mahupun resolusi syarikat dikeluarkan membenarkan beliau menjadi penjamin. Defendan Ketiga seterusnya mengatakan Plaintif gagal membuktikan bahawa Plaintif mempunyai lesen untuk memberikan kemudahan pemfaktoran. Perjanjian pemfaktoran yang dimasuki juga dikatakan bertentangan dengan prinsip Syariah.

Defendan Ketiga menuntut "balas bersyarat" ke atas Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua. Tuntutan Balas Bersyarat Defendan Ketiga adalah seperti berikut: "TUNTUTAN BALAS BERSYARAT DEFENDAN KETIGA

Bersyarat: Jika Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa D3 bertanggungan membayar apa-apa jumlah kepada Plaintif di bawah Al-Kafalah 28.05.2024 atau SD 11.06.2024, maka: a) D3 menuntut indemniti penuh terhadap D1(sebagai penghutang utama/principal debtor) bagi setiap sen yang dibayar oleh D3 kepada Plaintif; b) D3 menuntut contribution terhadap D2 (sebagai co-guarantor) pada kadar sama rata atau pro-rata jika terdapat had tanggungan yang berbeza; c) D3 memohon deklarasi subrogation dan manfaat terhadap sebarang sekuriti/hak tindakan yang dipegang Plaintif (jika ada) setelah D3 membuat apa-apa bayaran; d) Kos tuntutan balas ini; dan e) Apa-apa relif lanjut yang adil."

Ringkasnya, di dalam Penyataan Pembelaan dan Tuntutan Balas Defendan Ketiga mempertikaikan keabsahan dan penguatkuasaan Surat Jaminan/Al Kafalah yang menjadi asas tuntutan Plaintif ke atas Defendan Ketiga sebagai penjamin.

Aturan 14 kaedah 1 dan Aturan 14 kaedah 4 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah ("KKM") 2012 memperuntukkan seperti berikut: Permohonan oleh Plaintif untuk Penghakiman Terus (A.14, k.1)

Jika dalam suatu tindakan yang baginya kaedah ini terpakai suatu pernyataan tuntutan telah disampaikan kepada defendan dan defendan itu telah memasukkan kehadiran dalam tindakan itu, plaintif boleh, atas alasan bahawa defendan tidak mempunyai pembelaan kepada suatu tuntutan yang termasuk dalam writ, atau kepada suatu bahagian tertentu suatu tuntutan itu, atau tidak mempunyai pembelaan mengenai suatu tuntutan itu atau sebahagian daripadanya kecuali tentang amaun apaapa ganti rugi yang dituntut, memohon kepada Mahkamah untuk penghakiman terhadap defendan itu. Kebenaran untuk Membela (A.14,k.4)

Defendan boleh menunjukkan sebab menentang suatu permohonan di bawah kaedah 1 melalui afidavit atau selainnya hingga memuaskan hati Mahkamah.

Falsafah di bawah Aturan 14 KKM ialah untuk menyelesaikan dengan pantas tuntutan plaintiff ke atas defendan berkait tuntutan jumlah wang tertentu tanpa perlu melalui suatu perbicaraan di mana defendan jelas tidak mempunyai pembelaan. Halsbury's Laws of Malaysia, vol. 1, Civil Procedure, di muka surat 62 menyatakan seperti berikut: The underlying philosophy of the Order 14 procedure is to prevent the Plaintiff clearly entitled to his money from being delayed in obtaining his judgment where there is no fairly arguable defence to the claim and the procedure enables the Plaintiff to obtain a final judgment without a trial.

Di dalam kes John Wallingford v. The Directors & C of The Mutual Society [1880] 5 AC 685 (HL) di muka surat 699-700, Lord Haltherley merujuk prinsip penghakiman terus seperti berikut: "...I apprehend that from the first objects of these short methods of procedure has been to prevent unreasonable delay, a delay which was very prejudicial to the creditors, and never, I am afraid, or rather, I am pleased to say, can have been very beneficial to the debtor himself. Simply allowing legal proceedings to take place, in order that delay may be applied to the administration of justice as much as possible, is not an end or which we can conceive the Legislature to have framed the provisions which now exist under the several Judicature Acts. If a man really has no defence, it is better for him as well as his creditors, and for all the parties concerned, that the matter should be brought to an issue as speedily as possible; and therefore there was a power given in cases in which plaintiffs might think they were entitled to use the power by which, if it was a matter of account, an account might be immediately obtained upon the filing of a bill, or, if it was a matter in which the debt was clear and distinct, and in which nothing was needed to be said or done to satisfy a Judge that there was no real defence to the action, recourse might be hard to an immediate judgment and to an immediate execution."

Kes National Company for Foreign Trade v Kayu Raya Sdn Bhd [1984] 2 MLJ 300 sering dirujuk sebagai duluan undangundang mengenai prinsip-prinsip yang mengawal permohonan penghakiman terus. Mahkamah Persekutuan, melalui penghakiman George Seah HMP, memperjelaskan seperti berikut: "...We think it appropriate to remind ourselves once again that in every application under Order 14, the first considerations are (1) whether the case comes within the Order and (b) whether the plaintiff has satisfied the preliminary requirements for proceeding under Order 14. For the purposes of an application under Order 14 the preliminary requirements are:

the defendant must have entered an appearance;

(ii) the statement of claim must have been served on the defendant; and

(iii) the affidavit in support of the application must comply with the requirements of Rule 2 of the Order 14... ...If the plaintiff fails to satisfy either of these considerations, the summons may be dismissed. If however, these considerations are satisfied, the plaintiff will have established a prima facie case and he becomes entitled to judgment. The burden then shifts to the defendant to satisfy the Court why judgment should not be given against him."

Mahkamah Tinggi di dalam kes Sunsets Fortune Sdn Bhd v Special Coral Sdn Bhd [2021] MLJU 2544, dengan memetik penghakiman Mahkamah Agung di dalam kes Bank Negara Malaysia v Mohd Ismail & Ors [1992] 1 MLJ 400, menerangkan bahawa Mahkamah perlu menentukan daripada keterangan afidavit yang dikemukakan defendan tidak mempunyai pembelaan bona fide dan jika Mahkamah berpendapat sedemikian, Plaintif berhak mendapat penghakiman terus terhadap defendan. Sebaliknya, jika defendan berjaya menunjukkan terdapat pertelingkahan fakta material yang serius atau sebab lain yang mewajarkan suatu siasatan dibuat, kebenaran membela harus diberikan kepada defendan. Amarjeet Singh Serjit Singh PK (sebagaimana ketika itu) (sekarang HMR) memutuskan seperti berikut: [16] The governing principle concerning summary judgment is stated by the Supreme Court in Bank Negara Malaysia v Mohd Ismail & Ors [1992] 1 MLJ 400 as follows: The Plaintiff has to satisfy the court that the Defendant plainly and obviously has no defence to the plaintiff's claim or part of the plaintiff's claim. If the plaintiff is able to satisfy the court, then summary judgment should be entered in the plaintiff's favour. On the other hand, if the defendant can show that there is a serious conflict of material facts as disclosed in the opposing affidavits, or there is otherwise a triable issue worthy of judicial investigation in the trial of the action, or there is an important and difficult point of law requiring further and mature consideration at the trial, summary judgment should be refused. [18] The burden on the defendant is simply to raise a triable issue and it is settled law that a single triable issue is sufficient to warrant dismissing an application for summary judgment (South East Asia Insurance Bhd v Kerajaan Malaysia [1998] 1 CLJ 1045). In determining whether an issue is or is not triable the following often-quoted passage in the Bank Negara Malaysia case is instructive: ...the duty of a Judge does not end as soon as a fact is asserted by one party, and denied or disputed by the other on affidavit. Where such assertion, denial or dispute is equivocal, or lacking in precision or is inconsistent with undisputed contemporary documents or other statements by the same deponent or is inherently improbable in itself, then the Judge has a duty to reject such assertion or denial, thereby rendering the issue as not triable. ...Apart from identifying the issues of fact or law, the Court must go one step further and determine whether they are triable. This principle is sometimes expressed by the statement that a complete defence need not be shown. The defence set up need only show that there is a triable issue."

Di dalam kes Pustaka Yakin Pelajar Sdn Bhd v Penerbitan Inspirasi Sdn Bhd [2021] 10 MLJ 79, Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan sama ada terdapat isu yang perlu dibicarakan bergantung kepada fakta dan undang-undang yang berbangkit daripada kes yang diplidkan oleh pihak-pihak yang bertikai seperti mana yang didedahkan melalui keterangan afidavit yang berada di hadapan Mahkamah. Mohd Radzi Harun H (sekarang HMR) berkata: [8] To determine whether or not there exist a triable issue, this court would only need satisfied that there are inherently probable disputes and denials which would thus render the issue triable. This was the principle laid down by the then Supreme Court in Bank Negara Malaysia v Mohd Ismail & Ors [1992] 1 MLJ 400;; [1992] 2 CLJ Rep 186;; [1992] 1 CLJ 653 where it was held: In an application uder O 14, the court has to be satisfied on affidavit evidence that the defence has not only raised an issue, but also that the said issue is triable. The determination of whether an issue is or is not triable depends on the facts or the law arising from each case as disclosed in the affidavit evidence before the court. A complete defence need not be shown. The defence set up need only show that there is a triable issue."

Ringkasnya, di dalam permohonan penghakiman terus, plaintiff perlu memenuhi keperluan awalan untuk penghakiman terus, termasuk mengemukakan fakta yang menjadi asas kepada tuntutan plaintiff terhadap defendan. Beban adalah terletak pada bahu plaintiff untuk mengemukakan fakta tersebut menerusi afidavit sokongan. Kendatipun di peringkat ini plaintiff tidak dikehendaki membuktikan fakta yang menjadi asas tuntutannya, namun plaintiff dikehendaki menunjukkan fakta material yang secara prima facie menyokong kausa tindakan plaintiff, supaya wujud keadaan yang membolehkan penghakiman diberikan kepada plaintiff. Jika ini dicapai, maka beban berpindah kepada defendan untuk menunjukkan sebab-sebab penghakiman tidak sepatutnya diberikan. Dalam hal ini, defendan dikehendaki menunjukkan bahawa terdapat isu atau persoalan yang dipertikaikan yang patut dibicarakan atau kerana sesuatu sebab yang lain perbicaraan patut diadakan mengenai tuntutan plaintiff. ANALISA DAN DAPATAN MAHKAMAH Sama ada Perjanjian Jaminan tidak sah

Defendan Ketiga tidak mempertikaikan fakta bahawa beliau merupakan penjamin kepada Penjanjian Kemudahan Pemfaktoran yang dimasuki di antara Plaintif kepada Defendan Pertama atas permintaan Defendan Pertama. Defendan Ketiga mengatakan Surat Jaminan tersebut tidak sah kerana beliau telah ditekan dan/atau didorang melalui salah nyataan oleh Defendan Pertama dan/atau Defendan Kedua untuk menjadi penjamin kepada kemudahan pemfaktoran yang diberikan oleh Plaintif kepada Defendan Pertama, serta tidak mendapat nasihat undang-undang bebas. Yang jelas, pengataan Defendan Ketiga mengenai cabaran ke atas keabsahan Surat Jaminan tidak berpunca daripada tindakan atau perbuatan Plaintif.

Kendatipun begitu, keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh Defendan Ketiga jauh menyimpang daripada dakwaan yang dibuat oleh Defendan Ketiga. Defendan Ketiga telah mengemukakan keterangan yang menikam diri sendiri. Perbualan WhatsApp yang dieksibitkan oleh Defendan Ketiga di eks. M3, Kandungan 28, bertentangan dengan dakwaan yang dibuat oleh Defendan Ketiga mengenai ketidakrelaan/paksaan/tekanan/dorongan yang dikata berlaku keatas dirinya. Mesej-mesej perbualan WhatsApp yang dikemukakan memperlihatkan rasa syukur dan gembira Defendan Ketiga kerana dipilih terlibat sama dengan kontrak pembekalan yang dianugerahkan (award) oleh Defendan Keempat kepada Defendan Pertama. Malahan, Defendan Ketiga segera bertanyakan mengenai gaji dan komisyen yang bakal diterima olehnya. Nada dan rona perbualan Defendan Ketiga langsung tidak menunjukkan beliau dipaksa atau ditekan untuk menurut arahan pihak atasan ataupun meminta masa untuk berfikir dan mendapat nasihat perundangan terlebih dahulu. Untuk kemudahan rujukan diperturunkan di bawah ini mesej mesej perbualan tersebut:

Di dalam kes Prabakaren Mukunan v. Amritakumari Savandarajan [2026] CLJU 231, Pemohon cuba membatalkan penghakiman persetujuan yang telah dibuat, khususnya berkaitan caruman KWSP. Pemohon mendakwa terdapat salahnyataan dilakukan oleh peguam Responden yang mendorongnya memasuki penghakiman persetujuan. Julie Lack H membuat dapatan fakta bahawa tiada keterangan untuk membuktikan dakwaan sedemikian dan memutuskan seperti berikut: "40. In the present case, the Applicant claims that the Respondent's solicitor grossly misrepresented to him that the Respondent was entitled to fifty per cent (50%) of the entirety of the EPF funds standing to his credit. However, no proof whatsoever of any such gross misrepresentation has been placed before this Court. There is no affidavit evidence, contemporaneous correspondence, or objective material capable of substantiating this serious allegation. In the absence of such evidence, this Court is not prepared to accept the Applicant's bare assertions.

In my view, the Applicant's contention is untenable. The presumption in law is that a party who enters into and consents to a court order understands its contents and legal effect. The Applicant was at all material times free to obtain legal representation but consciously chose not to do so, of his own volition and for reasons of cost. He cannot now complain of unfairness arising from a choice he freely made. In any event, dissatisfaction with the outcome of a bargain or a subsequent change of mind can never constitute a basis to set aside a consent order solemnly recorded by the Court. 42. The Applicant's attempt to rely on authorities such as Eu Finance Bhd v. Lim Yoke Foo and Badiaddin bin Mohd Mahidin v. Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd is misconceived. Those cases concerned situations of nullity arising from a lack of jurisdiction or illegality. They are plainly distinguishable from the present case. Here, this Court unquestionably had jurisdiction to record a consent order in matrimonial proceedings, and the order made is entirely lawful under section 53A of the Employees Provident Fund Act 1991 and section 76 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976. There is therefore no legal foundation whatsoever for treating the consent order as a nullity.

In any event, this Court is of the considered view that there is no basis to nullify or set aside the consent order dated 5 July 2023. Parties to matrimonial proceedings are at liberty to agree on any proportion for the division of assets and to treat any asset as part of the matrimonial pool, whether acquired during the marriage or even prior to it, provided such agreement is lawful and made with the consent of both parties. To reiterate, where, as in the present case, the parties have freely negotiated and agreed upon the terms of division and invited the Court to record their agreement, the Court will uphold the sanctity and finality of that consent."

Cabaran Defendan Ketiga ke atas keabsahan Surat Jaminan tidak lebih tidak kurang merupakan suatu pemikiran semula setelah tindakan undang-undang dimulakan ke atasnya sebagai penjamin. Sebelum tindakan ini dimulakan, Defendan Ketiga tidak pernah mempersoalkan status Surat Jaminan. Adalah terlewat sekarang untuk Defendan Ketiga mempertikaikan keabsahan Surat Jaminan, apatah lagi setelah meminta laba sebagai upah menjadi penjamin. Tanggungan Defendan Ketiga sebagai penjamin berterusan selagi Defendan Pertama atau Defendan Keempat tidak membuat bayaran kepada Plaintiff. Klausa 3 Perjanjian Jaminan menyatakan seperti berikut:

Without affecting the Client's obligations, I/We, do extent my/our liability, shall be liable under this clause as if I/We was/were the principal debtor and not merely a surety and accordingly I/we shall not be discharged, nor shall my/our liability be affected, by anything which would discharge us or affect my/our liability if I/we was/were the principal debtor, including without limitation, in the event of:

Any obligation or purported obligation of the Client under or arising out of the Facility being or becoming wholly or in part invalid or unenforceable against the Client by reason of any defect in my/our insufficiency or want of powers of the Client or irregular or improper purported exercise thereof or breach or want of authority by any person purporting to act on behalf of the Client or because of any of your rights have become barred by the Limitation Act or otherwise or by reason of any Legal Limitation, disability, incapacity or any other fact or circumstances whether or not always known to us;

The Client ceasing to be legally liable to discharge any obligation or liability under or arising out of the Facility;

The avoidance or invalidity of any assurance, security or payment on any ground whatsoever, including without limitation, avoidance under any legislation relating to insolvency or liquidation of the Client or of my/our bankruptcy;

The dissolution, amalgamation, reconstruction or reorganization of you or the Client;

Indulgence, waiver or consent at any time given to the Client or us;

Any amendment to the Facility or, to any security other than this Guarantee;

The enforcement or absence of enforcement of the Facility or the terms of this Guarantee or any other security;

The illegality, invalidity or unenforceability of or any defect in any provision of the Facility to this Guarantee or any of the Client's obligation under the Facility;

The releases of any security other than this Guarantee; I/We hereby consent to all or any of the events provided above and declare that no further consent shall be required from me/us in respect thereof.

My/our liabilities and obligations under this Guarantee are joint and several and will remain in full force and effect by way of continuing security until no sum remains payable under the Facility and you have signed my/our absolute discharge or release and any composition or arrangement which you may effect with me/us shall be deemed to be made subject to the condition that it will be void, if any payment or security which you may previously have received or may hereafter receive from any person in respect of the Guaranteed Amount is set aside by any applicable law or proves to have been for any reason invalid.

This Guarantee shall not be determined or affected in any way by any change by amalgamation, reconstruction or otherwise which may be made in your constitution or by the liquidation or winding up of the Client.

This Guarantee shall not be considered as satisfied by any intermediate payment or satisfaction or the whole or any part of any sum or sums of money owing as aforesaid but shall be a continuing security and shall extend to cover any sum or sums of money which for the time being constitute the balance due from the Client to you under the Facility.

(a) This Guarantee shall be binding as continuing security upon me/us, my/our heirs, executors and permitted assigns and shall be enforceable against our successors-in-title and assigns.

In the event this Guarantee ceasing from any cause whatsoever to be binding as a continuing security on us, my/our successors in title and permitted assigns, you shall be at liberty without thereby affecting your rights hereunder either open a fresh account or accounts or to continue any existing account with the Client and no money paid time from time into any such account or accounts by or on behalf of the Client shall on settlement of any claim in respect of this Guarantee be appropriated towards or have the effect of payment of any part of money due from the Client at the date when the Guarantee is determined.

I/We hereby represents and warrant that: -

I/we have the power or the capacity to execute, deliver and perform the terms of this Guarantee;

This Guarantee constitutes my/our legal, valid and binding obligations in accordance with its terms;

The execution, delivery and performance of the Guarantee will not violate the provision of any law or regulation or any order or decree of any governmental authority, agency or court to which I/we are subject or any mortgage, contract or other undertaking or instrument to which I/we are a party or which is binding upon us or my/our assets;

I/we are not in default under any agreement to which I/we are a party or by which I/we may be bound and no litigation, arbitration or administrative proceedings, as the case may be, might materially affect my/our solvency or might affect my/our ability to perform my/our obligations under the Guarantee:

The indebtedness and other obligations incurred by us hereunder will rank at least pari passu in priority of payment and in all, other respects with all other general unsecured liabilities and obligations of my/ours, whether actual or contingent, except those which are preferred by Law;

I/we hereby acknowledge that you have accepted this Guarantee on the basis of and in full reliance on, the aforesaid representations and warranties, which will be correct and complied with in all material respect so long as this Guarantee shall remain in full force and each of the representations and warranties will be corrected and complied with in al material respects for so long as the Facility be in force.

I/we shall, for so long as this Guarantee shall remain in force, maintain the Client's solvency and provide the Client with sufficient funds by way of subordinated financing or otherwise to meet its obligations, including in particular but without limitations, all its obligations under the Facility.

This Guarantee shall be in addition to and shall not be in any way prejudiced or affected by any collateral or other security now or hereafter held by you for all, or any part of the Guaranteed Amount nor shall such collateral or other security or lien to which you may be otherwise entitled or the liability of any persons or corporation not parties hereto of all, or any part of the Guaranteed Amount be in any way prejudiced or affected by this present Guarantee. I/we shall make no claim to such collateral or other security or any part thereof or any interest therein unless and until I/we have been absolutely discharged or released in accordance with Clause 4 hereof.

I/we hereby declare that I/we have not received any security from the Client for entering into this Guarantee and agree that I/we will not until such time that I/we have been absolutely discharged or released in accordance with Clause 4 hereof take any security from the Client in respect of my/our liabilities hereunder without obtaining your consent and I/we agree that in the event of my/our taking such security it shall be held in trust for you and forthwith deposited with you and I/we hereby irrevocably appoint you as my/our agent with authority to do all acts and execute all documents on my/our behalf to protect your interest in such security.

Until such time as I/we have been absolutely discharged or released in accordance with Clause 4 hereof, I/we will not by paying off any sum recoverable hereunder or by any means or any other grounds claim any set-off or counterclaim against the Client whether in respect of any payment by me/us hereunder or otherwise howsoever or by counterclaim or proof against or dividend, composition or payment by the Client or any other security which you may now or hereafter hold for the Guaranteed Amount or to have any share therein.

This Guarantee shall be construed and take effect as guarantee of the whole and every part of the Guaranteed Amount and accordingly in the event of the liquidation or receivership of the Client, you (notwithstanding the payment to me/us to you or any part to the Guaranteed Amount) may rank as creditor and prove for the whole amount of its claim against the Client or agree to accept any composition in respect to the same and you may receive and retain the whole of the dividends, composition or other payments thereon. For the purpose of enabling you to sue the Client or prove against it for the whole of the Guarantee Amount any money received by virtue of or in connection with this Guarantee may be placed to the credit of a suspense account for such time as you shall think fit without any intermediate obligation on Sama ada Defendan Ketiga terikat dengan Surat Jaminan yang dilaksanakan dengan Plaintif.

Mahkamah ini telah memutuskan bahawa Surat Jaminan yang disempurnakan oleh Defendan Ketiga adalah sah dan berkuatkuasa. Lantaran daripada penemuan fakta tersebut, Defendan Ketiga tidak boleh melepaskan dirinya daripada tanggungjawab di bawah Surat Jaminan. Mahkamah Tinggi di dalam kes CIMB Islamic Bank Bhdv LCL Corp & Anor [2012] 3 MLJ 869 memutuskan seperti berikut: [57] In this case, the parties have voluntarily agreed to be bound by the terms and conditions of specific agreements as mentioned before. They have also agreed to be bound by some mechanism and process to give effect to the ultimate intention of the parties ie, to refinance the 1st BBA Facility. [58] His Lordship Visu Sinnadurai J in Polygram Records Sdn Bhd v. Hillary Ang & Ors & Anor [1994] 3 CLJ 806; [1994] 3 MLJ observed at p. 147 as follows: The general principle of law, of course, is that a party who signs a written contract is bound by the terms of the contract, except in the limited cases where fraud, undue influence, or misrepresentation may be established. This rule is so strict that even if a party to a contract has not read the contents of a contract, he is held to be bound by its terms. In the leading case of L'Estrange v. F Graucob [1934] 2 KB 394, Scrutton LJ pronounced (at p. 404): When a document containing contractual terms is signed, then, in the absence of fraud, or, I will add, misrepresentation, the party signing it is bound, and it is wholly immaterial whether he has read the document or not."

Di dalam kes Nor Azlina Abdul Aziz v Aminah Omar [1998] 2 CLJ 527, Abdul Malik Ishak H (kemudian HMR) memutuskan seperti berikut mengenai kedudukan orang yang menandatangani suatu dokumen: "...In my judgment the Defendant having signed the agreement must be bound by it. It was irrelevant and immaterial if the Defendant did not read the document in question. Even if the Defendant could not read the language in which the agreement was drafted, she was still bound by it contractually.."

Di dalam kes Ooi Yoke in (f) v Public Finance Berhad [1993] 2 CLJ 454 prinsip yang diputuskan di dalam kes L'Estrange v. F. Graucob Ltd [1934] 2 KB 394 telah diterima di mana Mahkamah mengatakan seperti berikut: "...The law is quite clear that when a party signs a contract knowing it to be a contract which governs the relations between them, binding them (so to speak), then, to borrow the words of Denning J in the case of Curtis v. Chemical Cleaning & Dyeing Co Ltd [1951] 1 All ER 631: his signature is irrefragable evidence of his assent to the whole contract, including the exempting clauses, unless the signature is shown to be obtained by fraud and misrepresentation. A pertinent point made by Scrutton LJ in L'Estrange v. F. Graucob Ltd [1934] 2 KB 394 needs mention and that is: When a document containing contractual terms is signed then in the absence of fraud or, I will add, misrepresentation, the party signing it is bound, and it is wholly immaterial whether he has read the document or not."

Defendan Ketiga merupakan penjamin persendirian/perseorangan dan bukannya memberi jaminan sebagai pengarah Defendan Pertama (director guarantee). Di dalam keadaan ini, tidak berbangkit isu Defendan Pertama perlu mengeluarkan resolusi sebelum Defendan Ketiga boleh menjadi penjamin. Isu ini ditimbulkan Defendan Ketiga tanpa memberi perhatian kepada status Defendan Ketiga yang bertindak atas kapasiti peribadi bagi menjamin kemudahan yang diperolehi oleh Defendan Pertama daripada Plaintif, di mana tanggungan Defendan Ketiga coextensive dengan tanggungan Defendan 1 sebagai penghutang utama, sebagaimana peruntukan seksyen 81 Akta Kontrak 1950. Wan Mohammad Amin Wan Yahya H di dalam kes Sim Cheng Young v. Datuk Wira Ranjeet Singh Sidhu [2025] CLJU 3550, ketika membincangkan kedudukan penjamin persendirian memutuskan seperti berikut: [16] Further, the Defendant's obligation under the Personal Guarantee is independent and co-extensive with 3Lyon's liability. The Plaintiff was entitled to pursue concurrent remedies. The principle in Azlin Azrai bin Lan Hawari v. United Overseas Bank (M) Bhd [2017] 10 CLJ 18; [2017] 5 MLJ 43 (COA) and section 8 of the Debtors Act 1957 makes clear that a JDS order does no t bar other forms of execution. The Court of Appeal clearly held, inter alia, that "JDS is no bar to proceedings in execution" and "an order to pay by installments of a judgment debt does not prevent the execution of a judgment". [17] In any event, the enforcement of a Personal Guarantee does not constitute execution of the Consent Judgment but rather the exercise of an independent contractual right vested in the Plaintiff to recover the sum which 3Lyon had undertaken to pay. The following passages from the Court of Appeal in Chong Yoong Choy (supra) is instructive and directly applicable to the present case: "The answer to counsel's second argument is to be found in the very guarantee which his client executed. Under cl 1 of that document, the appellant expressly undertook the obligations of a principal debtor. So it really does not matter what happened between the assignor (Prebore) and the debtor (Gunung Mewah). As far as the respondent is concerned, it entered into the factoring arrangement, encouraged, no doubt, by the appellant's promise to play the role of surety as well as principal debtor, thereby assuring the respondent that he would answer the debtor's default. Ought the appellant, having so encouraged the respondent to act, be permitted now to assert that the promise he gave, and upon the strength of which the respondent acted, is unenforceable for any number of reasons? We believe that justice and conscience move for a negative response to that question. It would, in our judgment, be entirely inequitable and unconscionable to permit the appellant to pursue such a course." (own emphasis added) [18] Hence, this ground fails. F] WHETHER THE PERSONAL GUARANTEE SUPPORTED BY VALID CONSIDERATION [19] The Defendant contends that the Personal Guarantee lacks consideration as the Plaintiff had already enforced the Consent Judgment. The evidence and correspondence, however, show that the Plaintiff agreed to suspend enforcement until 30.11.2024 in reliance upon the Defendant's undertaking. Such forbearance from immediate enforcement constitutes good consideration in law (Osman bin Abdul Ghani (supra)). [20] The Defendant, as Director of 3Lyon, was fully aware of the company's default and voluntarily assumed personal liability. Applying sections 79-81 of the Contracts Act 1950 and the authorities of EON Bank (supra) and Chong Yoong Choy (supra), the Personal Guarantee is a binding and enforceable obligation. G] WHETHER THERE EXISTS A BONA FIDE DEFENCE ON THE MERITS [21] The Defendant's allegation of mala fide conduct is unsubstantiated. The Plaintiff's pursuit of both the principal debtor and the guarantor is expressly permitted by law and by the terms of the Personal Guarantee. No evidence of fraud, unfairness, or abuse of process has been shown. [22] Having found that the JID was regularly obtained, I have also addressed in the foregoing paragraphs each of the Defendant's asserted defences, namely the alleged irregular service, the effect of the JDS order, the issue of consideration, and the allegation of mala fides. These defences, having been fully considered, disclose no bona fide or triable issue. They are either technical in nature or contradicted by the documentary evidence. The Defendant's failure to act promptly and the absence of any credible explanation for his non-appearance further militate against the exercise of discretion in his favour. Sama ada Plantif menjalankan perniagaan kemudahan pemfaktoran dengan sah dan berdasarkan prinsip Islamik

Bila mana Defendan Ketiga mencabar kedudukan Plaintif sebagai syarikat yang menjalankan perniagaan pemfaktoran yang berasaskan prinsip Islamik, Plaintif telah mengemukakan bukti-bukti berikut: a) Surat daripada Bank Negara dan Kementerian Kewangan Malaysia yang mengesahkan Plaintiff dilesenkan untuk menjalankan perniagaan kemudahan pemfaktoran yang dikeluarkan atas nama Anugerah Harta Sdn Bhd (eks. P-16, Kandungan 19) yang merupakan nama asal Plaintiff sebelum bertukar kepada nama sekarang. Surat-surat tersebut seperti di bawah: Y. Bhg. Dato' Mohd Khay bin Ibrahim Pengarah Urusan ANJUGERAH HARTA SDN. BHD. Aras 8, Bangunan ZIKAY 53 Jalan Raja Alang, Kampung Baru 60300 Kuala Lumpur Selangor Y. Bhg. Dato'. Institust-Institust Terjadual Kami merujuk permohonan Dato' bertarikh 10 Mac 2004.

Kami ingin memaklumkan bahawa syarikat ANUGERAH HARTA SDN. BHD. tolah marmatuhl kosemua peruntukan sekayen 21(1) Akita Bank dan Institual-Institut Kewangan 1969 (ABIK) borhubung dengan permangan permefektonn.

Kami juga ingin memaklumkan bahwa surat akuan pengesahan ini tidak boloh dianggap sebagal losen perilagaan atau dijadikan sebagal bukti keesahan bagi perilagaan yang tersebut di atas oleh ANUGERAH HARTA SON, BHD.

Barsama-sama int kaml sertakan resit bernombor 0014911 bagl pembayaran yuran sobanyak RM300. Soklan. Yang bonar [Norhayati Mohd Sidi] b/p Pengarah Jabatan Pongawatan Bank b) Sijil pengesahan daripada Tawafuq Consultancy Sdn Bhd yang memperakui bahawa perniagaan pemfaktoran yang dijalankan oleh Plaintif mematuhi prinsip Tawarruq dan Hawalah (eks. P-14, Kandungan 18). Sijil berkenaan adalah seperti berikut:

Dokumen-dokumen yang disalin di atas menunjukkan Plaintif dengan sahnya menjalankan perniagaan pemfaktoran berlandaskan prinsip Syariah. Cabaran ke atas status Plaintif sebagai syarikat yang menjalankan perniagaan pemfaktoran mengikut prinsip syariah tidak bermerit.

Berdasarkan alasan-alasan yang dicerakin di perenggan-perenggan di atas, adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini bahawa Defendan Ketiga secara tuntasnya tidak mempunyai pembelaan kepada tuntutan Plaintif. Pembelaan yang cuba dibangkitkan oleh Defendan Ketiga tidak selari dengan kandungan dokumen semasa (contemporaneous documents) yang dikemukakan sebagai eksibit. Pengataan Defendan Ketiga terjumlah kepada pengataan kosong yang bertentangan dengan dokumen semasa. Kandungan 11 dengan ini dibenarkan terhadap Defendan Ketiga (termasuk juga Defendan Kedua dan Defendan Keempat) seperti dipohon.

Setelah mendengar pihak-pihak, saya memutuskan kos sebanyak RM5,000.00 terhadap Defendan Kedua hingga Defendan Keempat masing-masingnya tertakluk kepada alokatur adalah munasabah dan mengawardkan jumlah tersebut sebagai kos permohonan dan tindakan ini. Bertarikh pada 3 Jun 2026 Peguam bagi pihak Plaintif:Rafizal Ahamadin bersama Nur Syamila Abu Bakar (Tetuan Shahrul & Rafizal)Peguam bagi pihak Defendan Kedua:L L Woon (Tetuan S L Goon & Partners)Peguam bagi pihak Defendan ketiga:Wan Mohamad Ashraf (Tetuan Ashraf & Co.)Peguam bagi pihak Defendan Keempat:Muhammad Adam Roger Bersama Muhammad Syafiq Aiman (Tetuan Mazlan & Associates)