Zulkifly Bin Abd Za'Par (JA-61R-2-01/2021)

Zulkifly bin Abd Za’par, the accused, was indicted at the Sessions Court with two initial charges and 18 amended charges, amounting to 20 charges as follows: Pertuduhan Pertama Bahawa kamu, antara 1hb hingga 15hb Julai 2018, di Restoran Lapan Kati Seafood, No 161 & 161a, Jalan Kenanga 29/4, Bandar Indahpura, dalam Daerah Kulai, dalam Negeri Johor Darul Ta’zim secara rasuah telah meminta bagi diri kamu suatu suapan berjumlah RM 2,000.00 daripada Lok Chen Leng dan Tee Ching Fung sebagai dorongan untuk melindungi syarikat Double Tree Vegetable Sdn. Bhd. dan Lian Hoe Huat Enterprise (M) Sdn. Bhd. yang menggajikan pendatang asing tanpa izin dengan menyalurkan maklumat operasi Jabatan Imigresen Johor. Oleh yang demikian, kamu telah melakukan kesalahan di bawah Seksyen 16 (a) (B) Akta Suruhanjaya Pencegahan Rasuah Malaysia 2009 dan boleh dihukum di bawah Seksyen 24 Akta yang sama. Pertuduhan Kedua Bahawa kamu, pada 15 Julai 2018, No 8 Jalan Setia Tropika 1/21, Setia Tropika di dalam daerah Johor Bahru, di dalam Negeri Johor Darul Ta’zim telah secara rasuah menerima suatu suapan ke dalam akaun Maybank Berhad Cawangan Setia Tropika bernombor akaun 151623109897 milik kamu iaitu wang berjumlah RM1,000.00 daripada Lok Chen Leng iaitu pengarah syarikat Double Tree Vegetable Sdn. Bhd. melalui Tan Yin Ning kepada kamu selaku Timbalan Penolong Pengarah Imigresen, Bahagian Pencegahan ATIPSOM dan AMLA, Jabatan Imigresen Malaysia sebagai dorongan melindungi syarikat Double Tree Vegetable Sdn. Bhd. dan Lian Hoe Huat Enterprise (M) Sdn. Bhd. untuk tidak dikenakan tindakan undang-undang kerana menggajikan pekerja bukan warganegara Malaysia tanpa permit yang sah, dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 16(a)(B) Akta Suruhanjaya Pencegahan Rasuah Malaysia 2009 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 24 Akta yang sama. Pertuduhan Pindaan Terhadap Pertuduhan Ketiga Bahawa kamu, pada 5 Januari 2019, No 25, Medan Nusa Perintis 6, Taman Nusa Perintis 2, Gelang Patah dalam daerah Johor Bahru, dalam Negeri Johor Darul Ta’zim telah secara rasuah menerima suatu suapan melalui akaun CIMB Berhad Cawangan Gelang Patah bernombor akaun 7043215566 milik kamu iaitu wang berjumlah RM2,000.00 daripada Tee Ching Fung iaitu pengurus syarikat Lian Hoe Huat Enterprise (M) Sdn. Bhd. kepada kamu selaku Timbalan Penolong Pengarah Imigresen, Bahagian Pencegahan ATIPSOM dan AMLA, Jabatan Imigresen Malaysia sebagai dorongan melindungi syarikat Double Tree Vegetable Sdn. Bhd. dan Lian Hoe Huat Enterprise (M) Sdn. Bhd. untuk tidak dikenakan tindakan undang-undang kerana menggajikan pekerja bukan warganegara Malaysia tanpa permit yang sah, dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 16(a)(B) Akta Suruhanjaya Pencegahan Rasuah Malaysia 2009 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 24 Akta yang sama. Pertuduhan Pindaan Terhadap Pertuduhan Keempat Bahawa kamu, pada 3 Mac 2019, No 25, Medan Nusa Perintis 6, Taman Nusa Perintis 2, Gelang Patah dalam daerah Johor Bahru, dalam Negeri Johor Darul Ta’zim telah secara rasuah menerima suatu suapan melalui akaun CIMB Berhad Cawangan Gelang Patah bernombor akaun 7043215566 milik kamu iaitu wang berjumlah RM2,000.00 daripada Tee Ching Fung iaitu pengurus syarikat Lian Hoe Huat Enterprise (M) Sdn. Bhd. kepada kamu selaku Timbalan Penolong Pengarah Imigresen, Bahagian Pencegahan ATIPSOM dan AMLA, Jabatan Imigresen Malaysia sebagai dorongan melindungi syarikat Double Tree Vegetable Sdn. Bhd. dan Lian Hoe Huat Enterprise (M) Sdn. Bhd. untuk tidak dikenakan tindakan undang-undang kerana menggajikan pekerja bukan warganegara Malaysia tanpa permit yang sah, dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 16(a)(B) Akta Suruhanjaya Pencegahan Rasuah Malaysia 2009 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 24 Akta yang sama. Pertuduhan Pindaan Terhadap Pertuduhan Kelima Bahawa kamu, pada 2 Julai 2019, No 25, Medan Nusa Perintis 6, Taman Nusa Perintis 2, Gelang Patah dalam daerah Johor Bahru, dalam Negeri Johor Darul Ta’zim telah secara rasuah menerima suatu suapan melalui akaun CIMB Berhad Cawangan Gelang Patah bernombor akaun 7043215566 milik kamu iaitu wang berjumlah RM3,000.00 daripada Tee Ching Fung iaitu pengurus syarikat Lian Hoe Huat Enterprise (M) Sdn. Bhd. kepada kamu selaku Timbalan Penolong Pengarah Imigresen, Bahagian Pencegahan ATIPSOM dan AMLA, Jabatan Imigresen Malaysia sebagai dorongan melindungi syarikat Double Tree Vegetable Sdn. Bhd. dan Lian Hoe Huat Enterprise (M) Sdn. Bhd. untuk tidak dikenakan tindakan undang-undang kerana menggajikan pekerja bukan warganegara Malaysia tanpa permit yang sah, dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 16(a)(B) Akta Suruhanjaya Pencegahan Rasuah Malaysia 2009 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 24 Akta yang sama. Pertuduhan Pindaan Terhadap Pertuduhan Keenam Bahawa kamu, pada 2 Ogos 2019, No 25, Medan Nusa Perintis 6, Taman Nusa Perintis 2, Gelang Patah dalam daerah Johor Bahru, dalam Negeri Johor Darul Ta’zim telah secara rasuah menerima suatu suapan melalui akaun CIMB Berhad Cawangan Gelang Patah 6 bernombor akaun 7043215566 milik kamu iaitu wang berjumlah RM3,000.00 daripada Lok Chen Leng iaitu pengarah syarikat Double Tree Vegetable Sdn. Bhd. melalui Tan Yin Ning kepada kamu selaku Timbalan Penolong Pengarah Imigresen, Bahagian Pencegahan ATIPSOM dan AMLA, Jabatan Imigresen Malaysia sebagai dorongan melindungi syarikat Double Tree Vegetable Sdn. Bhd. dan Lian Hoe Huat Enterprise (M) Sdn. Bhd. untuk tidak dikenakan tindakan undang-undang kerana menggajikan pekerja bukan warganegara Malaysia tanpa permit yang sah, dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 16(a)(B) Akta Suruhanjaya Pencegahan Rasuah Malaysia 2009 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 24 Akta yang sama. Pertuduhan Pindaan Terhadap Pertuduhan Ketujuh Bahawa kamu, pada 2 September 2019, No 25, Medan Nusa Perintis 6, Taman Nusa Perintis 2, Gelang Patah dalam daerah Johor Bahru, dalam Negeri Johor Darul Ta’zim telah secara rasuah menerima suatu suapan melalui akaun CIMB Berhad Cawangan Gelang Patah bernombor akaun 7043215566 milik kamu iaitu wang berjumlah RM3,000.00 daripada Tee Ching Fung iaitu pengurus syarikat Lian Hoe Huat Enterprise (M) Sdn. Bhd. kepada kamu selaku Timbalan Penolong Pengarah Imigresen, Bahagian Pencegahan ATIPSOM dan AMLA, Jabatan Imigresen Malaysia sebagai dorongan melindungi syarikat Double Tree Vegetable Sdn. Bhd. dan Lian Hoe Huat Enterprise (M) Sdn. Bhd. untuk tidak dikenakan tindakan undang-undang kerana menggajikan pekerja bukan warganegara Malaysia tanpa permit yang sah, dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 16(a)(B) Akta Suruhanjaya Pencegahan Rasuah Malaysia 2009 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 24 Akta yang sama. Pertuduhan Pindaan Terhadap Pertuduhan Kelapan Bahawa kamu, pada 2 Oktober 2019, No 25, Medan Nusa Perintis 6, Taman Nusa Perintis 2, Gelang Patah dalam daerah Johor Bahru, dalam Negeri Johor Darul Ta’zim telah secara rasuah menerima suatu suapan melalui akaun CIMB Berhad Cawangan Gelang Patah bernombor akaun 7043215566 milik kamu iaitu wang berjumlah RM3,000.00 daripada Lok Chen Leng iaitu pengarah syarikat Double Tree Vegetable Sdn. Bhd. kepada kamu selaku Timbalan Penolong Pengarah Imigresen, Bahagian Pencegahan ATIPSOM dan AMLA, Jabatan Imigresen Malaysia sebagai dorongan melindungi syarikat Double Tree Vegetable Sdn. Bhd. dan Lian Hoe Huat Enterprise (M) Sdn. Bhd. untuk tidak dikenakan tindakan undang-undang kerana menggajikan pekerja bukan warganegara Malaysia tanpa permit yang sah, dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 16(a)(B) Akta Suruhanjaya Pencegahan Rasuah Malaysia 2009 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 24 Akta yang sama. Pertuduhan Pindaan Terhadap Pertuduhan Kesembilan Bahawa kamu, pada 5 November 2019, No 25, Medan Nusa Perintis 6, Taman Nusa Perintis 2, Gelang Patah dalam daerah Johor Bahru, dalam Negeri Johor Darul Ta’zim telah secara rasuah menerima suatu suapan melalui akaun CIMB Berhad Cawangan Gelang Patah bernombor akaun 7043215566 milik kamu iaitu wang berjumlah RM3,000.00 daripada Tee Ching Fung iaitu pengurus syarikat Lian Hoe Huat Enterprise (M) Sdn. Bhd. kepada kamu selaku Timbalan Penolong Pengarah Imigresen, Bahagian Pencegahan ATIPSOM dan AMLA, Jabatan Imigresen Malaysia sebagai dorongan melindungi syarikat Double Tree Vegetable Sdn. Bhd. dan Lian Hoe Huat Enterprise (M) Sdn. Bhd. untuk tidak dikenakan tindakan undang-undang kerana menggajikan pekerja bukan warganegara Malaysia tanpa permit yang sah, dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 16(a)(B) Akta Suruhanjaya Pencegahan Rasuah Malaysia 2009 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 24 Akta yang sama. Pertuduhan Pindaan terhadap Pertuduhan Kesepuluh Bahawa kamu, pada 3 Disember 2019, No 25, Medan Nusa Perintis 6, Taman Nusa Perintis 2, Gelang Patah dalam daerah Johor Bahru, dalam Negeri Johor Darul Ta’zim telah secara rasuah menerima suatu suapan melalui akaun CIMB Berhad Cawangan Gelang Patah 9 bernombor akaun 7043215566 milik kamu iaitu wang berjumlah RM3,000.00 daripada Lok Chen Leng iaitu pengarah syarikat Double Tree Vegetable Sdn. Bhd. kepada kamu selaku Timbalan Penolong Pengarah Imigresen, Bahagian Pencegahan ATIPSOM dan AMLA, Jabatan Imigresen Malaysia sebagai dorongan melindungi syarikat Double Tree Vegetable Sdn. Bhd. dan Lian Hoe Huat Enterprise (M) Sdn. Bhd. untuk tidak dikenakan tindakan undang-undang kerana menggajikan pekerja bukan warganegara Malaysia tanpa permit yang sah, dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 16(a)(B) Akta Suruhanjaya Pencegahan Rasuah Malaysia 2009 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 24 Akta yang sama. Pertuduhan Pindaan Terhadap Pertuduhan Kesebelas Bahawa kamu, pada 2 Januari 2020, No 25, Medan Nusa Perintis 6, Taman Nusa Perintis 2, Gelang Patah dalam daerah Johor Bahru, dalam Negeri Johor Darul Ta’zim telah secara rasuah menerima suatu suapan melalui akaun CIMB Berhad Cawangan Gelang Patah bernombor akaun 7043215566 milik kamu iaitu wang berjumlah RM3,000.00 daripada Tee Ching Fung iaitu pengurus syarikat Lian Hoe Huat Enterprise (M) Sdn. Bhd. kepada kamu selaku Timbalan Penolong Pengarah Imigresen, Bahagian Pencegahan ATIPSOM dan AMLA, Jabatan Imigresen Malaysia sebagai dorongan melindungi syarikat Double Tree Vegetable Sdn. Bhd. dan Lian Hoe Huat Enterprise (M) Sdn. Bhd. untuk tidak dikenakan tindakan undang- 10 undang kerana menggajikan pekerja bukan warganegara Malaysia tanpa permit yang sah, dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 16(a)(B) Akta Suruhanjaya Pencegahan Rasuah Malaysia 2009 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 24 Akta yang sama. Pertuduhan Pindaan Terhadap Pertuduhan Kedua Belas Bahawa kamu, pada 2 Februari 2020, No 25, Medan Nusa Perintis 6, Taman Nusa Perintis 2, Gelang Patah dalam daerah Johor Bahru, dalam Negeri Johor Darul Ta’zim telah secara rasuah menerima suatu suapan melalui akaun CIMB Berhad Cawangan Gelang Patah bernombor akaun 7043215566 milik kamu iaitu wang berjumlah RM3,000.00 daripada Lok Chen Leng iaitu pengarah syarikat Double Tree Vegetable Sdn. Bhd. kepada kamu selaku Timbalan Penolong Pengarah Imigresen, Bahagian Pencegahan ATIPSOM dan AMLA, Jabatan Imigresen Malaysia sebagai dorongan melindungi syarikat Double Tree Vegetable Sdn. Bhd. dan Lian Hoe Huat Enterprise (M) Sdn. Bhd. untuk tidak dikenakan tindakan undang-undang kerana menggajikan pekerja bukan warganegara Malaysia tanpa permit yang sah, dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 16(a)(B) Akta Suruhanjaya Pencegahan Rasuah Malaysia 2009 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 24 Akta yang sama. Pertuduhan Pindaan Terhadap Pertuduhan Ketiga Belas Bahawa kamu, pada 3 Mac 2020, No 25, Medan Nusa Perintis 6, Taman Nusa Perintis 2, Gelang Patah dalam daerah Johor Bahru, dalam Negeri Johor Darul Ta’zim telah secara rasuah menerima suatu suapan melalui akaun CIMB Berhad Cawangan Gelang Patah bernombor akaun 7043215566 milik kamu iaitu wang berjumlah RM3,000.00 daripada Tee Ching Fung iaitu pengurus syarikat Lian Hoe Huat Enterprise (M) Sdn. Bhd. kepada kamu selaku Timbalan Penolong Pengarah Imigresen, Bahagian Pencegahan ATIPSOM dan AMLA, Jabatan Imigresen Malaysia sebagai dorongan melindungi syarikat Double Tree Vegetable Sdn. Bhd. dan Lian Hoe Huat Enterprise (M) Sdn. Bhd. untuk tidak dikenakan tindakan undang-undang kerana menggajikan pekerja bukan warganegara Malaysia tanpa permit yang sah, dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 16(a)(B) Akta Suruhanjaya Pencegahan Rasuah Malaysia 2009 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 24 Akta yang sama. Pertuduhan Pindaan Terhadap Pertuduhan Keempat Belas Bahawa kamu, pada 8 April 2020, No 25, Medan Nusa Perintis 6, Taman Nusa Perintis 2, Gelang Patah dalam daerah Johor Bahru, dalam Negeri Johor Darul Ta’zim telah secara rasuah menerima suatu suapan melalui akaun CIMB Berhad Cawangan Gelang Patah 12 bernombor akaun 7043215566 milik kamu iaitu wang berjumlah RM3,000.00 daripada Lok Chen Leng iaitu pengarah syarikat Double Tree Vegetable Sdn. Bhd. kepada kamu selaku Timbalan Penolong Pengarah Imigresen, Bahagian Pencegahan ATIPSOM dan AMLA, Jabatan Imigresen Malaysia sebagai dorongan melindungi syarikat Double Tree Vegetable Sdn. Bhd. dan Lian Hoe Huat Enterprise (M) Sdn. Bhd. untuk tidak dikenakan tindakan undang-undang kerana menggajikan pekerja bukan warganegara Malaysia tanpa permit yang sah, dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 16(a)(B) Akta Suruhanjaya Pencegahan Rasuah Malaysia 2009 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 24 Akta yang sama. Pertuduhan Pindaan Terhadap Pertuduhan Kelima Belas Bahawa kamu, pada 5 Mei 2020, No 25, Medan Nusa Perintis 6, Taman Nusa Perintis 2, Gelang Patah dalam daerah Johor Bahru, dalam Negeri Johor Darul Ta’zim telah secara rasuah menerima suatu suapan melalui akaun CIMB Berhad Cawangan Gelang Patah bernombor akaun 7043215566 milik kamu iaitu wang berjumlah RM3,000.00 daripada Tee Ching Fung iaitu pengurus syarikat Lian Hoe Huat Enterprise (M) Sdn. Bhd. kepada kamu selaku Timbalan Penolong Pengarah Imigresen, Bahagian Pencegahan ATIPSOM dan AMLA, Jabatan Imigresen Malaysia sebagai dorongan melindungi syarikat Double Tree Vegetable Sdn. Bhd. dan Lian Hoe Huat Enterprise (M) Sdn. Bhd. untuk tidak dikenakan tindakan undang- 13 undang kerana menggajikan pekerja bukan warganegara Malaysia tanpa permit yang sah, dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 16(a)(B) Akta Suruhanjaya Pencegahan Rasuah Malaysia 2009 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 24 Akta yang sama. Pertuduhan Pindaan Terhadap Pertuduhan Keenam Belas Bahawa kamu, pada 3 Jun 2020, No 25, Medan Nusa Perintis 6, Taman Nusa Perintis 2, Gelang Patah dalam daerah Johor Bahru, dalam Negeri Johor Darul Ta’zim telah secara rasuah menerima suatu suapan melalui akaun CIMB Berhad Cawangan Gelang Patah bernombor akaun 7043215566 milik kamu iaitu wang berjumlah RM3,000.00 daripada Lok Chen Leng iaitu pengarah syarikat Double Tree Vegetable Sdn. Bhd. kepada kamu selaku Timbalan Penolong Pengarah Imigresen, Bahagian Pencegahan ATIPSOM dan AMLA, Jabatan Imigresen Malaysia sebagai dorongan melindungi syarikat Double Tree Vegetable Sdn. Bhd. dan Lian Hoe Huat Enterprise (M) Sdn. Bhd. untuk tidak dikenakan tindakan undang-undang kerana menggajikan pekerja bukan warganegara Malaysia tanpa permit yang sah, dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 16(a)(B) Akta Suruhanjaya Pencegahan Rasuah Malaysia 2009 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 24 Akta yang sama. Pertuduhan Pindaan Terhadap Pertuduhan Ketujuh Belas Bahawa kamu, pada 2 Julai 2020, No 25, Medan Nusa Perintis 6, Taman Nusa Perintis 2, Gelang Patah dalam daerah Johor Bahru, dalam Negeri Johor Darul Ta’zim telah secara rasuah menerima suatu suapan melalui akaun CIMB Berhad Cawangan Gelang Patah bernombor akaun 7043215566 milik kamu iaitu wang berjumlah RM3,000.00 daripada Tee Ching Fung iaitu pengurus syarikat Lian Hoe Huat Enterprise (M) Sdn. Bhd. kepada kamu selaku Timbalan Penolong Pengarah Imigresen, Bahagian Pencegahan ATIPSOM dan AMLA, Jabatan Imigresen Malaysia sebagai dorongan melindungi syarikat Double Tree Vegetable Sdn. Bhd. dan Lian Hoe Huat Enterprise (M) Sdn. Bhd. untuk tidak dikenakan tindakan undang-undang kerana menggajikan pekerja bukan warganegara Malaysia tanpa permit yang sah, dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 16(a)(B) Akta Suruhanjaya Pencegahan Rasuah Malaysia 2009 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 24 Akta yang sama. Pertuduhan Pindaan Terhadap Pertuduhan Kelapan Belas Bahawa kamu, pada 5 Ogos 2020, No 25, Medan Nusa Perintis 6, Taman Nusa Perintis 2, Gelang Patah dalam daerah Johor Bahru, dalam Negeri Johor Darul Ta’zim telah secara rasuah menerima suatu suapan melalui akaun CIMB Berhad Cawangan Gelang Patah 15 bernombor akaun 7043215566 milik kamu iaitu wang berjumlah RM3,000.00 daripada Lok Chen Leng iaitu pengarah syarikat Double Tree Vegetable Sdn. Bhd. kepada kamu selaku Timbalan Penolong Pengarah Imigresen, Bahagian Pencegahan ATIPSOM dan AMLA, Jabatan Imigresen Malaysia sebagai dorongan melindungi syarikat Double Tree Vegetable Sdn. Bhd. dan Lian Hoe Huat Enterprise (M) Sdn. Bhd. untuk tidak dikenakan tindakan undang-undang kerana menggajikan pekerja bukan warganegara Malaysia tanpa permit yang sah, dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 16(a)(B) Akta Suruhanjaya Pencegahan Rasuah Malaysia 2009 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 24 Akta yang sama. Pertuduhan Pindaan Terhadap Pertuduhan Kesembilan Belas Bahawa kamu, pada 9 September 2020, No 25, Medan Nusa Perintis 6, Taman Nusa Perintis 2, Gelang Patah dalam daerah Johor Bahru, dalam Negeri Johor Darul Ta’zim telah secara rasuah menerima suatu suapan melalui akaun CIMB Berhad Cawangan Gelang Patah bernombor akaun 7043215566 milik kamu iaitu wang berjumlah RM3,000.00 daripada Tee Ching Fung iaitu pengurus syarikat Lian Hoe Huat Enterprise (M) Sdn. Bhd. kepada kamu selaku Timbalan Penolong Pengarah Imigresen, Bahagian Pencegahan ATIPSOM dan AMLA, Jabatan Imigresen Malaysia sebagai dorongan melindungi syarikat Double Tree Vegetable Sdn. Bhd. dan Lian Hoe Huat Enterprise (M) Sdn. Bhd. untuk tidak dikenakan tindakan undang- 16 undang kerana menggajikan pekerja bukan warganegara Malaysia tanpa permit yang sah, dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 16(a)(B) Akta Suruhanjaya Pencegahan Rasuah Malaysia 2009 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 24 Akta yang sama. Pertuduhan Pindaan Terhadap Pertuduhan Kedua Puluh Bahawa kamu, pada 4 Oktober 2020, No 25, Medan Nusa Perintis 6, Taman Nusa Perintis 2, Gelang Patah dalam daerah Johor Bahru, dalam Negeri Johor Darul Ta’zim telah secara rasuah menerima suatu suapan melalui akaun CIMB Berhad Cawangan Gelang Patah bernombor akaun 7043215566 milik kamu iaitu wang berjumlah RM3,000.00 daripada Lok Chen Leng iaitu pengarah syarikat Double Tree Vegetable Sdn. Bhd. melalui Tan Yin Ning kepada kamu selaku Timbalan Penolong Pengarah Imigresen, Bahagian Pencegahan ATIPSOM dan AMLA, Jabatan Imigresen Malaysia sebagai dorongan melindungi syarikat Double Tree Vegetable Sdn. Bhd. dan Lian Hoe Huat Enterprise (M) Sdn. Bhd. untuk tidak dikenakan tindakan undang-undang kerana menggajikan pekerja bukan warganegara Malaysia tanpa permit yang sah, dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 16(a)(B) Akta Suruhanjaya Pencegahan Rasuah Malaysia 2009 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 24 Akta yang sama.

The accused claimed trial to the charges and was represented by a Counsel. A Deputy Public Prosecutor from the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) conducted the prosecution. At the close of the prosecution’s case, this Court found it had made out a prima facie case against the accused on all charges except for the 19th amended charge. Thus, the accused was called upon to enter on his defence to all charges, except the aforementioned charge.

At the close the defence’s case, this Court found that the prosecution had proved its case against the accused beyond a reasonable doubt on all the remaining charges. Therefore, he was found guilty and convicted.

After hearing and considering submissions from both sides, the accused was sentenced to 4 years’ imprisonment from the date of the sentence, and a fine of 20,000 ringgit (in default, 3 months’ jail) for each of the offences. All the sentences of imprisonment were ordered to run concurrently. In the absence of any special or exceptional circumstances, I denied the accused’s application for a stay of execution of the sentence of imprisonment pending appeal.

Being dissatisfied, the accused is now appealing the convictions and sentences to the High Court.

To prove its case, the prosecution called 19 witnesses.

The accused worked as an immigration officer in Putrajaya from 2017 until suspended by the department in 2020. Whilst working there, he was placed in the Anti-Trafficking in Persons and Anti-Smuggling of Migrants (ATIPSOM) and Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorism Financing (AMLA) Division of the Immigration Department of Malaysia. Since his family members lived in Kulai, Johor, the accused frequently drove back from Putrajaya to be with them on weekends.

PW1 and PW2 were husband and wife. They were also directors of Double Tree Vegetable Sdn Bhd (DTVSB), which sold and supplied vegetables in Johor and Singapore. The company had its factory in Kempas Lama, Johor Baru, Johor. Its workers consisted of local and foreign workers. However, none of the company’s foreign workers had valid work permits.

PW2 and PW14 were close friends. PW14 worked as a manager with Lian Hoe Huat Enterprise (M) Sdn Bhd (LHHE). The company also sold vegetables. It had its factory in Kulai, Johor. Apart from local workers, 19 the company hired foreign workers, including those without valid work permits.

Both PW2 and PW14 needed to obtain work permits for their illegal workers. They were worried that the authorities would find out about the offences committed and that they would be taken to task. Both of them had applied for permits for their workers, but were unsuccessful. They were also cheated by agents, costing them a lot of money.

Both men were introduced to the accused by PW3 in a pub in Johor Bahru. PW3 was the pub’s owner and a friend of PW14. Both PW2 and PW14 agreed to meet with the accused to apply for permits for their workers with the Immigration Department (the department). However, nothing of significance transpired during the first meeting apart from getting to know each other.

Sometime in the middle of 2018, PW2 and PW14 met with the accused at the Restoran Lapan Kati (the restaurant) in Kulai. The purpose of the meeting was for both of them to inquire with the accused about how to correctly apply for and obtain the workers’ permits from the department. They did not ask him about it during the first meeting in the pub earlier. Significantly, both informed the accused that they had illegal workers operating their businesses. Therefore, they asked him how to apply for the quota and work permits for their foreign workers.

The accused replied that, for the time being, they could not apply because the application period had already lapsed. Then both of them asked what they should do. The accused said he would ask his friend who was working with the department at the branch in Setia Tropika, Johor Baharu.

The accused then used a telephone to call his friend at the department. He told his friend that he had two friends who sold vegetables and employed illegal workers. He asked whether his friend could assist. Whilst speaking on the telephone, the accused asked PW2 and PW14 how much they were willing to give. PW2 and PW14 had a brief discussion, then raised their index fingers, indicating RM1,000.00 each every month, because they had illegal workers.

Both men subsequently agreed to take turns to pay the accused. The first payment was made in July 2018 by PW2, amounting to RM1,000.00. Starting in July 2019, both agreed to pay the accused RM1,500.00 each every month so that their businesses would not be disturbed.

The MACC later arrested the three of them during a special operation in 2020. The accused was then indicted on the charges mentioned in this Court.

For the first charge, the accused was charged with corruptly soliciting for himself a gratification as an inducement on account of his being an officer of a public body for forbearing to do something in respect of an actual matter in which a public body was concerned. The offence was pursuant to section 16(a)(B) of the MACC Act 2009 (the Act), which was:

Any person who by himself, or by or in conjunction with any other person –

corruptly solicits or receives or agrees to receive for himself or for any other person; or

corruptly gives, promises or offers to any person whether for the benefit of that person or of another person, any gratification as an inducement to or a reward for, or otherwise on account of–

(A) any person doing or forbearing to do anything in respect of any matter or transaction, actual or proposed or likely to take place; or

(B) any officer of a public body doing or forbearing to do anything in respect of any matter or transaction, actual or proposed or likely to take place, in which the public body is concerned, commits an offence. [Emphasis added] [18] For the rest of the indictments, the accused was charged with corruptly receiving for himself gratifications as inducements on account of him being an officer of a public body for forbearing to do something in respect of an actual matter in which a public body was concerned also pursuant to section 16(a)(B) of the MACC Act 2009 (the Act), which was:

Any person who by himself, or by or in conjunction with any other person –

corruptly solicits or receives or agrees to receive for himself or for any other person; or

corruptly gives, promises or offers to any person whether for the benefit of that person or of another person, any gratification as an inducement to or a reward for, or otherwise on account of–

(B) any person doing or forbearing to do anything in respect of any matter or transaction, actual or proposed or likely to take place; or

(B) any officer of a public body doing or forbearing to do anything in respect of any matter or transaction, actual or proposed or likely to take place, in which the public body is concerned, commits an offence. [Emphasis added] [19] Section 16(a)(B) of the Act provides for numerous distinct offences that must be carefully studied and dissected to determine their ingredients. [20] In the first charge concerning the offence of solicitation, the prosecution did not state whether the accused had, by himself, or by or in conjunction with any other person, solicited the gratification. However, in the trial, the prosecution adduced only evidence that the accused had solicited gratification himself. [21] For the remaining 18 charges relating to the offence of receiving gratification, the prosecution also did not state in the indictments whether the accused had received the gratifications by himself, or by or in conjunction with any other person. Nevertheless, as with the first charge, I found that the prosecution had adduced clear and sufficient evidence that the accused had received the gratifications by himself, and not by or in conjunction with any other person. [22] Therefore, this was not a situation in which the accused did not know what he was charged with or was unable to answer the charges. In any event, there was no duplicity in the charges; they were not for unknown offences and were not defective in law. In point of fact, the accused never alleged that he was misled or prejudiced, that the gratifications asked were not by him, or that it was unfair to him not to know what he was alleged to have committed in order to mount an effective defence. Thus, the failure to specify in the charges that the accused himself, who solicited and received the gratifications, was not fatal to the prosecution’s case. [23] For the first charge, the prosecution was required to prove all ingredients of the offence, which were:

that the accused himself corruptly solicited the gratification for himself from PW2 and PW14;

that the gratification was an inducement for the accused to forbear to do something in an actual matter against PW2 and

that the accused was an officer of a public body in which the public body was concerned. [24] For the other 18 charges, the prosecution needed to prove all the ingredients for the offences as follows:

that the accused himself corruptly received gratifications for himself from PW2 and PW14;

that the gratification was an inducement for the accused to forbear to do something in an actual matter against PW2 and

that the accused was an officer of a public body in which the public body was concerned. The first charge

that the accused himself corruptly solicited the gratification for himself from PW2 and PW14; [25] For the first ingredient of the offence, the word ‘corruptly’ was discussed in Public Prosecutor v. Jamil bin Mahmod & Anor [1998] 1 LNS 312. It was stated that: The key word in both ss.3 and 4 is “corruptly”. When used in a statute, this term generally imports a wrongful design to acquire some pecuniary or other advantage. ( Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed). The word “corruptly” ... sounds the keynote to the conduct ... the giving of a gift or consideration, not bona fide but mala fide, and designedly, wholly or partially, for the purpose of bringing about the effect forbidden by the section : R v. Gross [1946] OR 1 at p. 9, per Roach JA. ... it means an act by one man knowing that he is doing what is wrong, and knowing so with evil feelings and evil intentions ( Lim Kheng Kooi & Anor v. R [1957] MLJ 199 at p. 205, per Sheperd J), an act which the law forbids as intending to corrupt ( Wellburn [1979] 69 Cr APP R 254). [Emphasis added] [26] In PP v. Datuk Harun bin Haji Idris (No 2) [1977] 1 MLJ 15, Raja Azlan Shah FCJ ( as His Royal Highness then was) had this to say: But what is or is not “corrupt” is a question of intention. If the circumstances show that what a person has done or has omitted to do was moved by an evil intention or a guilty mind, then he is liable under the section. [Emphasis added] [27] It is instructive that in Public Prosecutor v. Jamil bin Mahmod & Anor (supra), the meaning of the word “solicit” was also considered. The Court said that: The ordinary meaning of ‘solicit’ is to ask repeatedly or earnestly for or seek or invite (The Concise Oxford Dictionary 9th Ed). Indeed, in PP v. You Kong Lai [1985] 1 MLJ 298, Shankar J (as he then was) likened ‘solicit’ in s 3 to ‘invite’. When used in the context of solicitation of a bribe, it means ‘asking, enticing or requesting’. It is a word which implies a serious request, but ‘requires no particular degree of opportunity, entreaty, imploration or supplication’ (Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed), citing People v. Phillips 70 Cal App 2d 449). [Emphasis added] [28] In addition, the Court in PP v. You Kong Lai [1985] 1 MLJ 298 said that: The presence of the word “solicit” in the section, to my mind, clearly shows that if a person invites the payment of monies so that it may allegedly use the same to bribe a member of a public body, he has already committed an offence. The fact that the corrupt purpose was not carried out does not matter. [Emphasis added] [29] What was the incriminating evidence that the accused corruptly solicited for himself the gratification? Let us begin with the testimony of PW2, who was selling vegetables and needed valid work permits for his workers. [30] During his meeting with the accused at the restaurant, where PW14 was also present, PW2 told the accused that all his workers did not have work permits. He added that, despite applying many times for the permits, he was not successful, and that he was cheated twice, resulting in a significant financial loss. Further, PW2 said in his written statement (PSSP2) in paragraphs 15 and 16 that:

Saya dan Ah Hong ada tanya Tuan Zul, “Macam mana mahu “apply” kuota dan permit pekerja warganegara ikut prosedur yang betul? Tuan Zul jawab, “ Buat masa sekarang, kuota dan permit pekerja asing tidak boleh “apply” kerana tempoh untuk “apply” kuota dan permit pekerja asing sudah tutup”. Saya pun tanya pada Tuan Zul, “So, macam mana saya mahu buat?”. Tuan Zul jawab, “Nanti saya tanya kawan Imigresen yang bertugas di pejabat Imigresen Cawangan Setia Tropika, Johor Bahru”. Tidak lama selepas itu, Tuan Zul “call” kawan dia Pegawai Imigresen itu. Tuan Zul tanya Pegawai Imigresen itu, “Saya ada 2 kawan jual sayur.

1 dekat Kulai, 1 dekat Kempas, Mereka ada pekerja asing yang tidak ada permit yang betul. “You” boleh tolong jaga tak?”. Masa Tuan Zul masih bercakap di telefon dengan Pegawai Imigresen itu, Tuan Zul tanya saya dan Ah Hong, “Berapa you orang mahu kasi?. Saya tengok Ah Hong dan kami bincang sekejap. Lepas itu, saya dan Ah Hong angkat jari telunjuk dan tunjukkan kepada Tuan Zul bermaksud saya dan Ah Hong setuju bayar RM1,000.00 seorang sebulan sebab saya dan Ah Hong ada pekerja asing yang tidak ada permit kerja yang betul. Saya dan Ah Hong faham wang RM1,000.00 seorang setiap bulan itu juga adalah upah kepada Tuan Zul sebab tolong jaga (cover) saya dan Ah Hong kerana ada pekerja asing yang tidak ada permit kerja yang betul. [Emphasis added] [31] From the testimony above, the accused stated that the application for the permits could not be made because the period had already closed. On further inquiry by PW2 about what was to be done, the accused called his friend to ask whether his friend could take care of PW2 and PW14. Then, the accused asked PW2 and PW14 what they were willing to give. Whether the accused actually called and spoke with someone working at the Setia Tropika department was beside the point. The prosecution didn’t need to prove that the accused was actually speaking to his friend, who worked there. What it needed to establish was the accused’s act of soliciting gratification from PW2 and PW14. [32] PW2 and PW14 responded that they were willing to pay an amount. In such a situation, it was clear to me that the payment agreed by PW2 and PW14 had nothing to do with the workers’ permit application, as the accused had said the application was closed. They decided to pay because the accused had indicated to them that his friend could take care of them and had also asked how much they were willing to give. The question about how much they were willing to give could only mean how much money PW2 and PW14 were willing to pay to the accused. Further, they believed the accused could help them by taking care of them, as they were hiring foreign workers without permits, and that was why they complied with the accused’s solicitation. [33] PW2’s testimony was initially supported by PW14, which was essentially the same. According to his witness statement (PSSP14), PW14 agreed to pay what the accused asked, not for the permits but for the accused to take care of his business through the accused’s friend. [34] In PW2’s cross-examination, it was put to him that he was not sure of what he said in paragraph 16 of his witness statement, that he was not 100% sure of the facts and that the accused did not ask him what he was willing to give. PW2 disagreed with all the suggestions that the accused did not request payment. The notes of evidence showed: S : Tidak boleh ingat apa yang Encik Ah Boy bagi tahu di dalam perenggan 16 ini. Soalan saya berkaitan perenggan

Jadi saya katakan apa yang ada dalam para 16 itu pun Encik Ah Boy tidak pasti ketika itu? J : Tidak setuju. S : Jadi kamu pasti bahawa di dalam perenggan 16 ini kononnya ada perbualan telefon antara Tuan Zul dan kononnya dengan seorang Pegawai Imigresen, kamu pasti itu berlaku? J : Pasti. .............................................................. .............................................................. S : Saya cadangkan kepada kamu bahawa fakta perjumpaan di Lapan Kati ini adalah fakta yang tidak tepat bermakna 100% tidak seperti yang kamu kata setuju atau tidak? J : Tidak setuju. .............................................................. .............................................................. S : You kata Tuan Zul ada call, kemudian tanya berapa you mahu kasi ini tidak berlaku? J : Tidak setuju. [35] As I understood it, suggestions or questions in cross-examination are not evidence. They only showed the stand taken by the accused or indicative of the case put forward. The accused would have to raise the challenges by way of suggestions; otherwise, the evidence adduced would be deemed admitted by him. However, they cannot be substituted for evidence if the suggestion is repudiated or disagreed with by a witness such as PW2 in the instant case: Emperor v. Karimuddi AIR 1932 Cal 373; Public Prosecutor v. Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim (No.3) [1999] 2 MLJ 1. The suggestion does not prove anything and will remain nothing unless agreed to or admitted by a witness. Since PW2 disagreed with the suggestions put to him, they could not be used to absolve the accused because they were not evidence. [36] As for PW14, the accused’s cross-examination led him to admit that he could not confirm the written statements that incriminated the accused, especially the solicitation. This was because he said it had been too long for him to remember. He also made the same admission during the prosecution’s re-examination. [37] So, the question was: did the accused corruptly solicit gratification from PW2 and PW14? I had considered and evaluated all the evidence adduced as aforesaid and found that the accused had, in fact, corruptly solicited the gratification. Despite PW14, who later said he could not remember what had transpired, this Court could still rely on the sole testimony of PW2. After all, section 134 of the Evidence Act 1950 [Act 56] stipulates that no particular number of witnesses shall in any case be required for the proof of any fact. [38] In my considered opinion, PW2 was a credible witness who testified truthfully that the accused had solicited gratification from him and PW14. Given that he was a credible witness and his evidence was satisfactory, there was no need to corroborate his testimony. Regardless, the purpose of corroboration is not to give validity or credence to evidence that is deficient or suspect or incredible but only to confirm and support that which, as evidence, is sufficient and satisfactory and credible (DPP v. Hester [1972] 3 All ER 1056; Francis Antonysamy v. PP [2005] 2 CLJ 481). I also had the advantage of seeing and hearing PW2 testify. He was steadfast, convincing, and there was no indication that he was not telling the truth about the accused’s solicitation. As mentioned, I accepted PW2’s evidence that the accused solicited the gratification. [39] Concerning PW14, who admitted he could not remember whether the accused solicited gratification, this admission alone could not vindicate the accused. Anyway, PW14 never testified or said that the accused did not solicit. He just could not remember his previously written statements. In my view, his evidence concerning the solicitation was neither exculpatory for the accused nor inculpatory against him. It was neutral evidence that did not favour the prosecution or the defence. Therefore, I did not think that the accused could use PW14’s neutral evidence to raise any reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case. [40] I accepted PW2’s evidence that the accused asked both him and PW14, who was also present, what they were willing to give. As discussed and previously found, there was sufficient incriminating evidence against the accused that he did, in fact, solicit gratification from both PW2 and PW14, and not just from PW2 alone. [41] Apart from PW2, I found that PW1’s evidence strengthened PW2’s testimony. As mentioned, PW1 was also a director at the same company. PW2 instructed her to transfer RM1,000.00 to the accused’s bank account, which she did. Granted that at the time, she did not know what the transfer was for, and she did not ask PW2. However, PW1’s transmission of money to the accused supported PW2’s evidence that the accused had solicited gratification from him. Otherwise, why would PW2 decide to give the money to the accused? There was no evidence that the purpose was anything else, anyway. [42] In analysing the evidence of PW1 and PW2, I found nothing to suggest they had any motive to falsely implicate the accused. Why should they? They needed the accused for business, so they agreed to pay him. He was given the money because he solicited it. There was no evidence that PW1 and PW2 decided to provide the funds without the accused having asked for them. Thus, I was satisfied to find that both witnesses were credible and told the truth. [43] Further, I was reminded that the probabilities of the case were critical to consider when assessing witness credibility. It was inherently improbable that PW1 and PW2 were lying to fix the accused. It was also unlikely that they would go to all the trouble to create a false narration against him. There was nothing to show that they had an axe to grind as well. They wanted to continue doing business despite employing illegal workers because the permit application period had expired. Surely, they had nothing to gain by testifying against the accused, as they wanted the accused’s help in operating their business. In fact, their testimonies portrayed them unfavourably because they agreed to pay a bribe. In Public Prosecutor v. Mohd Bandar Shah bin Nordin & Anor [2008] 4 MLJ 556, the Court of Appeal opined: If a witness’s evidence is improbable, this would be a good reason for rejecting his evidence or according it very little weight. By the same token, where the evidence of a witness accords with the probabilities of a case, it would be a serious misdirection on the part of the trial court to give it little or no weight on grounds of credibility. [Emphasis added] The Federal Court in Md Zainudin Raujan v. PP [2013] 4 CLJ 21 opined: It is trite that the inherent probability or improbability of a fact in issue must be the prime consideration in deciding whether a witness is credible or not. It is the duty of the court to sieve the evidence and to ascertain what are the parts of the evidence tending to incriminate the accused which he accepted. [Emphasis added] [44] From the decided cases that I cited on the meanings of ‘corrupt’ and ‘solicit’, I was satisfied that the accused had corruptly solicited money from PW2 and PW14. Evidence showed that he realised that what he did was wrong. After all, he was an immigration officer who knew about illegal foreign workers. His intention stemmed from a guilty mind as he solicited gratification from PW2 and PW14 to take care of those who had illegal workers. Thus, what the accused did was clearly unlawful and had nothing to do with an innocent request. [45] In the premises, I found that the prosecution had proved the first ingredient of the offence for the first charge, namely that the accused corruptly solicited the gratification from PW2 and PW14.

(ii) that the gratification was an inducement for the accused to forbear to do something in an actual matter against PW2 and PW14; [46] Money is a form of gratification according to section 3 of the Act which provides: “gratification” means –

money, donation, gift, loan, fee, reward, valuable security, property or interest in property being property of any description whether movable or immovable, financial benefit, or any other similar advantage; ........................................ ........................................ [Emphasis added] [47] Not all gratification amounts to bribery. For example, a fixed and regular monthly salary for a salaried worker is also a form of gratification. It became corruption, as in the instant case, when gratification was solicited as an inducement for the accused to commit an unlawful act. It is a question of intention. [48] To induce someone is to persuade, influence or cause somebody to do something. A company could offer a bonus as an inducement for employees to work overtime. However, an offer of a bribe to do something is an illegal inducement. As to the meaning of inducement for corruption, I was also guided by the decision in PP v. Datuk Harun bin Haji Idris (No 2) [1977] 1 MLJ 15, where the word inducement was explained: The word “inducement’ evidently refers to a future act. What is forbidden, generally speaking, is soliciting a gratification as an inducement to do any matter or transaction .......... The gravamen of the offence is soliciting a gratification as an inducement to do any official act or conduct. This need not be proved by explicit evidence but may be inferred from surrounding circumstances. Just as “corruptly solicit’ may be inferred from all the surrounding circumstances,......... so can “inducement” be inferred from acts or conduct from the relevant circumstances. [Emphasis added] [49] From the evidence adduced and from what I had previously discussed, I found that the accused was informed that PW2 and PW14 had illegal workers working for them. That was why they met the accused: as an immigration officer, they wanted his help in successfully applying for valid workers’ permits. The accused told them it could not be done and offered another way, asking his friend to take care of them. Further, the accused asked both of them how much they were willing to give. This could only mean how much money they agree to pay the accused so that enforcement action would not be taken against them. [50] There was no doubt in my mind that the accused, by his conduct and what he implicitly said, had informed PW2 and PW14 that he could protect them from any action by the department for breaking the law. Thus, the money requested, i.e., the gratification, was an inducement for the accused to forbear from doing something in an actual matter against PW2 and PW14. To forbear means to refrain from doing something or from enforcing what was supposed to be done. [51] Given that the inducement was not to take any action against both companies that were hiring illegal workers, I found that the inducement was for the accused, as an officer of the department, to forbear from doing something in respect of an actual matter in which the department was concerned: see paragraph (B) of section 16 of the Act. It was an actual matter because both companies were hiring illegal workers, and the accused was informed. [52] In the circumstances, I was satisfied to find that the prosecution had proved the second ingredient of the offence for the first charge.

(iii) that the accused was an officer of a public body in which the public body was concerned. [53] On the third ingredient, that the accused was an officer of a public body in which the public body was concerned, I found the evidence further supported the prosecution’s case. Section 3 of the Act reads: “public body” includes –

the Government of Malaysia; ........................................ ........................................

any department, service or undertaking of the Government of Malaysia, .... ........................................ ........................................ [54] The same section 3 provides: “officer of a public body ”means any person who is a member, an officer, an employee or a servant of a public body, and includes a member of the administration, a member of Parliament, a member of a State Legislative Assembly, a judge of the High Court, Court of Appeal or Federal Court, and any person receiving any remuneration from public funds, and, where the public body is a corporation sole, includes the person who is incorporated as such; [55] The prosecution called PW5 to admit evidence pursuant to section 55 of the Act, which stipulates: Certificate of position or office held

(1) A certificate issued by a principal or an officer on behalf of his principal shall be admissible in evidence in any proceedings against any person for any offence under this Act as prima facie proof that the person named in such certificate –

held the position, office or capacity as specified in such certificate and for such period as so specified; and

received the emoluments as specified in such certificate.

A certificate issued under subsection (1) shall be prima facie proof that it was issued by the person purporting to issue it as principal or on behalf of the principal without proof of the authority of such person to issue it. [Emphasis added] [56] PW5 was from the Human Resource Management Division of the department in Putrajaya. Through her, P29(1-3) in 3 pages was purported to be a certificate under section 55 and admitted as evidence. P29 (1-3) was dated 24.1.2020 and signed by her. The content of P29(1-3) showed that the accused held the office of Assistant Superintendent of Immigration with ATIPSOM and the AMLA Prevention Division, Immigration Department Headquarters, Malaysia, in Putrajaya, on the dates when all the offences were committed. P29(1-3) further showed the emoluments received by the accused. [57] There were also other documents attached to P29(1-3), including the List of Duties and photostated copies purportedly from the accused’s service book. This attachment was not required in proof of section 55 of the Act. It had nothing to do with proof concerning the office held by the accused and the emoluments received. The prosecution needed only to prove relevant evidence as stipulated by the law and nothing more. The defence chose not to cross-examine PW5 and did not dispute her proof. I was satisfied to admit P29(1-3) as evidence. [58] Apart from that, I think there was another less time-consuming and simpler way to adduce evidence under the provisions of the Act. That provision concerned a certificate. It was not required for the prosecution to call a witness, such as PW5, to testify. What was needed was only a certificate in compliance with section 55 of the Act. In my view, the certificate may be tendered through the Investigation Officer. The provision did not make it mandatory for a principal or an officer acting on behalf of the principal to appear in Court and testify. After all, the certificate shall be prima facie evidence without proof of the signature of the person who issued it or of the authority of such person to issue it. There was no need to present the whole service book to the Court either. [59] The evidence adduced established that the accused held his office and received his emoluments while working as an immigration officer with the department. And he was an officer of a public body as stipulated in section 3 of the Act. He knew that PW2 and PW14 did business with the help of illegal workers, which was an offence under the immigration laws. To protect the two companies from enforcement action by the department, the accused solicited an inducement. [60] As such, there was no doubt in my mind that the accused was an officer of a public body in which the public body was concerned. Thus, I found the prosecution had proved the third ingredient of the offence for the first charge. The second charge until the 20th charge, excluding the 19th charge

that the accused corruptly received gratifications for himself from PW2 and PW14; [61] During the trial, the defence did not dispute that money was transferred into the accused’s accounts as alleged in all the charges. However, his defence was that the funds received in his accounts were for commission and consultation fees for work he had done. This meant the gratification was not corruptly received. I disagreed with this contention and will say more on it later. [62] Despite the accused not disputing that money was received into his accounts for all the charges, I had also found that the prosecution had, in fact, proved that PW2 and PW14 had transferred the money into the accused’s accounts. In the instant case, it was proved that the accused had two bank accounts. First, the Maybank account number 151623109897, which was P52(1-3), as testified by PW12, the Maybank bank manager. Second, the CIMB bank account with account number 7043215566. According to PW11, the bank manager, the bank was previously known as Bumiputera-Commerce Bank Berhad, and the accused account number was 01190063364529 before it was changed to 7043215566; see paragraph 2 of PW11’s written statement (PSSP11). [63] Next, for the second charge against the accused, it was proved by bank statement P51(1-13), on the second page, that PW1 on 15.7.2018 had transferred RM1,000.00 to the accused’s Maybank account. PW1 and PW12 also testified this. Thus, the prosecution had proved that the accused received the amount of money as charged. [64] For the remaining 17 charges, PW11, the bank manager, had testified in his written statement (PSSP11) at paragraphs 6 and 8 that the accused had received the money into his CIMB bank accounts. The evidence was further supported by the accused’s bank statement, which was P49 on pages 30, 31, 35, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, and 49. Apart from that, PW1, PW2 and PW14 had also testified that they sent the money to the accused’s account. Hence, the prosecution had proved that the accused received all the funds as charged. [65] Now, the accused was charged with the offence of ‘receiving’ the money for himself. He was not charged with the crimes of ‘accepting’ or ‘obtaining’ gratification, such as under section 17(a) of the Act. In the correct Malay language translation, receiving is “menerima”, accepting is ‘menyetuju terima’ and obtaining is “memperoleh”. The difference between the words is not merely semantics. The words had different legal effects and consequences. In my view, receiving something is not the same as accepting or obtaining something. In the context of the said three offences, the three words should not be used and applied interchangeably because the offences are distinct. Each word has a definite meaning in what the prosecution is required to prove against an accused. After all, Parliament did not legislate in vain to come out with the three distinct offences as provided for in the Act. [66] Receiving focuses more on the physical or formal act of getting something or being given something. It emphasises the act of taking possession of something offered, sent or delivered. It does not necessarily imply agreement, consent or approval. For example, “He received the bad news that was sent to him” or “He received the payments after asking how much the victims were willing to give”. Therefore, from the evidence adduced, I found that the prosecution had complied with the meaning of the word and had proved that the accused had received the money. [67] The next question was, did the accused corruptly receive the gratification? It was clear and undisputed that the accused was an immigration officer. PW2 and PW14 had informed him that they had illegal workers working for them. Apparently, this was an offence under the Immigration Act 1959/63 (Revised 1975) [Act 155]. The offence committed might have been under:

section 55B for employing any person who was not in possession of a valid Pass; or

section 56(1)(d) for harbouring any person whom he knows or has reasonable grounds for believing to have acted in contravention of the Act; or

section 55E states no occupier shall permit any illegal immigrant to enter or to remain at any premises. [68] But what did the accused do? Instead of taking action by reporting the case to his department, he did nothing and continued to receive all the money in his bank accounts from people who were hiring illegal workers. Was this an act of an innocent person, or was it gratification corruptly received by someone who had committed a crime? What the accused did was what paragraph (B) of section 16 of the Act envisages. He corruptly received gratification for himself, as an officer of the department, for forbearing to do something in respect of an actual matter in which the department was concerned. [69] As mentioned previously, the accused’s defence was that all the money he received was commission and consultation fees for the work done for PW2 and PW14. The pertinent question was, what type of work did he do for them? What sort of commission and consultation fees did PW2 and PW14 have to pay? And why must it be paid so many times between 2018 and 2020? Let us look at all the evidence adduced or the lack of it. [70] In the trial, I found no shred of evidence that the accused performed any work or consultation for PW2 or PW14 that would warrant the 19 payments. As shown previously, the facts were straightforward and uncomplicated. PW2 and PW14 decided to meet with the accused to obtain his assistance in obtaining the permits for their workers. The accused informed them that it could not be done. Instead of doing any work for them or providing any real consultation to obtain valid permits, the accused asked them what they were willing to pay to hire the illegal workers. And after that, he received money from the two men in 19 instalments between 2018 and 2020. That was it. At the end of it all, PW2 and PW14 failed to get any permits for their illegal workers. Does that mean the funds received were actually for the work and consultation performed by the accused for the two men? The answer had to be in the negative. Thus, I rejected this defence by the accused. [71] In any event, I had evaluated the evidence of PW1, PW2, and PW14 in its entirety, not in bits and pieces in isolation. None of the witnesses had ever categorically affirmed that the accused was entitled to any commission or consultation fees of any kind or amount. In fact, PW1 unequivocally stated that the accused had no business dealings, held no office and was not a consultant with her company. Further, PW2 disagreed with the suggestion that he often had business discussions with the accused. No reasonable doubt could be raised through speculation and conjecture. I was further guided by the decision of Abdul Rahman bin Sebli JCA (as he then was) in Wen Wuzhuang v. PP [2018] 1 LNS 1676. In paragraph 43, His Lordship said: Any finding of fact must be based on evidence and nothing else and this applies even where the burden is merely to raise a reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case. The Court does not deal in conjecture or speculation and there are good grounds for this which we need not elaborate on. [Emphasis added] [72] In the circumstances, I was constrained to find that the prosecution had proved the first ingredient for all the charges.

(ii) that the gratification was an inducement for the accused to forbear to do something in an actual matter against PW2 and PW14. [73] Just like with the first charge, I found that the gratification was an inducement for the accused to forbear from doing something in an actual matter against PW2 and PW14 for the same reasons I explained previously. [74] Therefore, the prosecution had proved the second ingredient of the offence for all the charges against the accused.

(iii) that the accused was an officer of a public body in which the public body was concerned [75] For the third ingredient of the offence for the charges, I was further constrained to find that the prosecution had proved the ingredient. My opinion was the same based on what I wrote earlier in this judgment. The presumption under section 50(1) of the Act [76] Section 50(1) of the Act reads: Where in any proceedings against any person for an offence under section 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22 or 23 it is proved that any gratification has been received or agreed to be received, accepted or agreed to be accepted, obtained or attempted to be obtained, solicited, given or agreed to be given, promised, or offered, by or to the accused, the gratification shall be presumed to have been corruptly received or agreed to be received, accepted or agreed to be accepted, obtained or attempted to be obtained, solicited, given or agreed to be given, promised, or offered as an inducement or a reward for or on account of the matters set out in the particulars of the offence, unless the contrary is proved. [Emphasis added] [77] As I had discussed and found earlier, the primary facts and ingredients required to apply the presumption were proved for the charge. For the first charge, it was proved that the accused himself solicited the gratification for himself. And for the remaining 18 charges, it was proved that the accused himself received the gratification for himself. In other words, the prosecution had proved the prerequisites or the condition precedents to apply section 50(1) of the Act. [78] The presumption should not be invoked in the absence of those requirements. In Ng Kim Huat v. Public Prosecutor [1961] 1 LNS 73, Thomson CJ opined that: It is surely elementary to observe that while a statutory presumption when it arises may operate in place of evidence and so reverse the onus of proof on any point the bare potential existence of such a presumption cannot of itself dispense with proof of any fact the existence of which is a condition precedent of the presumption arising. To say otherwise would fly in the face of all the rules of logic. [Emphasis added] [79] As such, I was satisfied to apply the presumption that the accused had corruptly solicited and corruptly received gratifications as an inducement on account of the matters set out in the particulars of the offences, unless the contrary is proved. The accused was called upon to rebut the presumption on the balance of probabilities: Public Prosecutor v. Yuvaraj [1969] 2 MLJ 89. I also informed the parties that I applied the presumption during the decision delivered at the close of the prosecution’s case. Conclusion at the close of the prosecution’s case [80] Even though all the 19 charges framed said the accused was protecting the two companies, all that the prosecution was required to prove, in addition to the gratification and inducement, was that he, as an officer of a public body, forbore to do something in an actual matter in which the public body was concerned. That is to say, as an immigration officer, he did not take any action against the two companies despite knowing they were hiring illegal workers, which was the department’s concern. From all the evidence adduced, the charges were proved to be so. With due respect, in my view, it was unnecessary to call more witnesses, tender additional documents, or spend more time proving anything else. [81] I carefully scrutinised and evaluated the credibility of the witnesses, as well as the reliability of the evidence. This Court found the prosecution had adduced credible evidence to prove all the ingredients of the offences against the accused. Credible evidence is evidence that has been filtered and has gone through the process of evaluation, and any evidence that is unsafe should be rejected: PP v. Ong Cheng Heong [1998] 4 CLJ 209. [82] On maximum evaluation, the accused failed to raise any reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case. The often-quoted principle guided me that a reasonable doubt must arise from the evidence or the want of evidence and cannot be an imaginary doubt unrelated to the evidence: Public Prosecutor v. Saimin & Anor [1971] 1 LNS 115. [83] A prima facie case had been made out against the accused on the offences charged and the accused must be called upon to enter on his defence: section 173(h)(i) of the Code. A prima facie case is where the prosecution had adduced credible evidence proving each ingredient of the offences which if unrebutted or unexplained would warrant a conviction: section 173(h)(iii) of the Code. This Court had also explained the three options for the accused to defend himself. [84] I had subjected the whole evidence to a maximum evaluation, which was explained by the Federal Court decision in Magendran Mohan v. PP [2011] 1 CLJ 805: [25] The test at the end of the prosecution’s case is “prima facie case” based on a maximum evaluation of evidence. The evidence has to be scrutinised properly and not perfunctorily, cursorily or superficially. If the evaluation of the evidence results in doubts in the prosecution’s case, then a prima facie case has not been made out. The defence ought not be called merely to clear or clarify such doubts. [Emphasis added] [85] Thus, the totality of the evidence against the accused was sufficient for the defence to be called, and I was prepared to convict the accused on the charges if he had elected to remain silent: Balachandran v. PP [2005] 1 CLJ 85; PP v. Mohd Radzi bin Abu Bakar [2006] 1 CLJ 457. The defence’s case [86] The accused elected to give sworn evidence from the witness’s box. He called five other witnesses to testify. [87] I would have to consider the evidence of the accused against the ingredients of the offence proved by the prosecution. There was no requirement to revisit the prosecution’s case on the findings. This was because I had made a maximum evaluation of the evidence and found the witnesses credible and reliable. As such, it is wrong in law to revisit the findings. [88] The Federal Court in Duis Akim & Ors v. PP [2013] 9 CLJ 692 ruled that: We note that when assessing the defence the learned trial judge surprisingly revisited his earlier findings upon which he called for the defence. Such approach is quite contrary to the principle of maximum evaluation of the evidence adduced at the close of the prosecution’s case. Indeed in his judgment the learned trial judge made it very clear that he had conducted a maximum evaluation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution before calling for the defence. [Emphasis added] [89] Therefore, this Court was only required to test and compare the evidence by the accused at this stage with the evidence establishing the prima facie case by the prosecution. Juxtapose both versions, evaluate, weigh and decide whether the accused managed to raise any reasonable doubt on the prosecution’s case at this stage. At the end of it, whether the prosecution would be able to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt on the charge. Accused’s testimony (DW1) [90] Regarding all the charges against him, the accused did not deny that the funds were transferred into his accounts. However, he denied that they were transferred because of corruption. He said PW1, PW2, and PW14 transferred the funds to him for business and for his services as a consultant to PW2 and PW14. [91] He added that one of his services to them as a consultant was the issuance of Approved Permits (APs) for vegetables. He claimed the advice he gave them reduced their AP hiring costs, since what PW2 and PW14 were doing was too expensive. That was why he introduced them to one Dato Jef. Dato Jef had his contacts and was able to lessen their cost of doing business. At the same time, the accused said he was just an introducer who introduced the two men to Dato Jef. This was what he said: “Saya sebagai introducer memperkenalkan mereka dan they are very happy boleh reduce the cost”. [92] However, the accused’s claim that he reduced PW2’s and PW14’s costs was never expressly put to them during their cross-examination. The only thing done was during PW2’s cross-examination, in which he was asked about the AP. However, it was never put to PW2 that the accused had reduced his cost, and PW2 never admitted what the accused had claimed. Why was that so, and why must the accused keep it up his sleeve? The result was that the two men had no opportunity to admit, deny, or explain anything in response to the accused’s claim. This was an adversarial trial in which parties had to comply with the rule of essential justice. Thus, this was also an afterthought and a recent invention by the accused. He failed to offer any explanation on this belated afterthought defence, and I did not accept it as raising any reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case: Public Prosecutor v. Lin Lian Chen [1992] 4 CLJ 2086; Megat Halim Megat Omar v. PP [2009] 1 CLJ 154. [93] The accused further claimed that he suggested to PW2 and PW14 that they sell their vegetables using the market lots allocated to them. His idea was for them to increase profits by cutting out the middlemen. For this purpose, the accused introduced them to one Dato Sri Sulaiman Zainuddin. As he had conveyed earlier in the AP for vegetables, the accused was merely matching them with the Dato Sri. This was what he said: - “Itu saya cuma matchkan je, the rest saya tak nak campur”. - “Saya cuma bagi idea so the rest saya kenalkan link so the rest dia orang akan fikirkan jalan. Saya tidak terlibat pasal saya berulang, saya banyak weekdays saya di Putrajaya only weekend sahaja saya balik”. [94] However, the accused later denied that he was only an introducer, and not a consultant. This was what he said during his cross-examination: TPR : Jadi setuju saya katakan peranan Encik Zul berkenaan dengan AP sayur hanya setakat itu sahaja kenalkan Dato Jef setuju ataupun tidak? OKT: Tidak setuju. TPR : Saya katakan tiada langsung khidmat konsultan berkaitan dengan AP sayur kepada Ah Boy dan Ah Hong? OKT: Tidak setuju. -------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------- TPR : Sama juga untuk Dato Sri Sulaiman ini peranan Encik Zul hanyalah untuk sebagai memperkenalkan sahaja mereka bertiga? OKT : Tidak setuju. [95] In my considered opinion, the answers he gave to his Counsel and during his cross-examination were not just minor inconsistencies. They were major contradictions because these different pieces of evidence went to the heart of the accused’s defence and affected his credibility. His defence was that he was not corrupt and that he received the monies as a consultant for the work he had done. If that was so, why did he tell Counsel that he was only an introducer who made the introductions and that he was not involved after that? [96] It could only mean that he was not a consultant. In my view, a consultant is usually a professional who provides expert advice in a specified field or area. He or she is usually hired to help solve problems, improve performance or provide specialised knowledge. Merely introducing people and letting them participate in an endeavour on their own is clearly not a consultant. However, why did the accused later disagree with the prosecution that he was not a consultant? This meant that he was a consultant. [97] Therefore, was he a consultant or was he not? These major contradictions in the accused’s defence undermined his credibility and truthfulness. The pertinent questions were: did he inadvertently say he was merely an introducer and later realise his mistake during cross-examination, and was that why he disagreed that he was not a consultant? [98] The contradictions were not explained away during his re-examination when he had the chance. Given the unanswered questions, I found that the accused failed to raise any reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case that he was a consultant entitled to the payments. [99] Be that as it may, I further found that the accused failed to explain why the payments to him were made in 19 instalments. Why was it from 2018 to 2020, when he was later arrested? What sort of consultancy work did he do for PW2 and P14 for almost 2 years, involving all 19 portions? Apart from being an introducer and a consultant, he said he was also a broker. So which one is which? He further claimed that the monies he received were commissions for work he had done for PW2 and PW14. He was allowed to clarify all those contentions in his defence, but he failed to do so. [100] Next, the accused also claimed that his superior defamed him. His boss was not pleased with him and falsely alleged that the accused was the head of a syndicate that was involved in human trafficking and had an income of almost six million ringgit. The accused insinuated that was the reason the MACC arrested him. I found that the allegation that he was defamed as such by someone was not proved at all during the trial. It was merely what he alleged, and his superior was not even called as a witness to verify. As it happened, the MACC had arrested him for corruptly soliciting and receiving gratifications, and not for having millions of ringgit in his account. [101] In addition, the accused alleged that he was victimised by Rasyidi, a MACC officer who was involved in the investigation against him. According to the accused, Rasyidi asked him to accept Faizal as his lawyer to defend himself and that Faizal was a great lawyer. Afterwards, Faizal asked the accused to pay him RM300,000.00, and said that he would ensure that the accused’s case would not go to court. However, the accused thought Faizal was not a lawyer but was pretending to be one. That was why he refused to comply with Rasyidi’s suggestion. [102] As a result, the accused claimed that the investigation against him was conducted in a manner that incriminated him. A news report dated 25.5.2023, purportedly from the online news Free Malaysia Today (D78), was tendered by the defence. It was about two men who were charged in the Kuala Lumpur Court, together with their photographs. The accused identified one of them as Rasyidi, the MACC officer. To my mind, the purpose of referring to the news and the picture was twofold. First, it was to show that Rasyidi was really a MACC officer. The other one was to imply that Rasyidi was up to no good in his dealings with the accused. [103] I had also carefully considered this particular contention. It seemed to me that the accused’s claim was just a mere conjecture on his part. There was no evidence adduced that the accused was fixed by someone called Rasyidi or anyone else during the investigation, with the result that he was subsequently charged in Court. Rasyidi and Faizal were not called as witnesses during the trial, and the accused’s allegations were not supported by evidence. [104] In any case, it was not up to the investigators to simply determine whether anyone would be indicted. Further, there was no evidence that Rasyidi was charged because of what he had done to the accused or that he had any relation to the accused’s case. Even the accused did not say so, and I did not think that any reasonable doubt could be raised with regard to the conjecture. [105] Conjecture and speculation are mere possibilities without the support of any evidential basis. Of course, anything is possible, but the Court could not determine a case against someone on guesswork. I think it is well settled that reasonable doubt must arise from evidence adduced during the trial or the lack of it, not from unfounded possibilities. [106] The rest of the accused’s testimony consisted of his extensive experience and contacts in dealing with other businesses and people. Whether as an introducer or a consultant, obtaining the commissions and the rest. In my view, the accused may well have been someone who admirably operated as such without doing anything unlawful and deserved the payments given to him. But it would be a real stretch and an exaggeration to hold that the same guiltless activities were applicable in his dealings with PW2 and PW14. The facts and circumstances were necessarily different, and the prosecution had proved that the accused corruptly solicited and received gratifications from the two men. Thus, I did not accept how the accused conducted himself with other people in other situations, as raising any reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case. [107] To recapitulate, the accused denied any wrongdoing. A denial without any evidence to support was not sufficient to create reasonable doubt and to force out the prosecution’s case. Therefore, the term ‘bare denial’. And no weight could be given to bare denial against the prosecution’s evidence. A bare denial is no defence: Paramasivan & Ors. v. Public Prosecutor [1948] 1 LNS 90; PP v. Reza Mohd Shah Ahmad Shah [2002] 1 LNS 157; Losali v. PP [2012] 2 CLJ 178. [108] Nevertheless, the nature of an explanation is more important than any explanation. I was guided by the Court of Appeal’s decision in Ong Hooi Beng & Ors v. PP [2015] 3 MLJ 812, in which Abdul Rahman Sebli JCA (as he then was) opined that: In our opinion whether or not a defence amounts to a mere denial is to be determined not by the fact it is coupled with an explanation but by the nature of the explanation. A denial may well be coupled with an explanation but if the explanation is merely to deflect the prosecution’s case evidence without answering the real questions in controversy to reasonably dislodge the prosecution evidence it remains a mere denial for what it is worth. [Emphasis added] [109] By the nature of the explanations given by the accused, they did not answer the fundamental question in dispute. They merely sought to divert from the evidence adduced by the prosecution. Their nature comprised afterthoughts, contradictions, and unanswered questions. Apart from that, they also consisted of conjecture and unsubstantiated claims. Thus, I did not accept or believe the accused’s explanation and the explanation did not raise in my mind any reasonable doubt as to his guilt: Mat v. PP [1963] 1 LNS 82. DW2’s testimony [110] DW2 worked with the defence counsel’s firm. The defence sought to comply with section 90A(2) of the Evidence Act 1950 to prove that certain documents were produced by a computer in its ordinary use and that DW2 was responsible for the management of the operation of that computer. Therefore, a certificate (D90) was tendered through DW2, and the documents listed therein were admissible as evidence. [111] However, the weight and the degree of credit to be attached to the documentary evidence were matters altogether different. The Court had considered and evaluated them, together with the rest of the evidence adduced at trial. DW3’s testimony [112] DW3 worked as an account executive at Syakira EJ Enterprise Sdn Bhd. She testified that her company had appointed the accused as its consultant. To support her evidence, an independent consultant agreement (D80) was tendered in Court. D80 showed that the agreement was between her company and the accused, acting as a consultant, for which he received payments in 2023. [113] It was clear to me that the purpose DW3 was called to testify was to support the contention that the accused was a consultant who received monthly payments from June 2013 until November 2013. And, by extension, to argue that there was nothing nefarious about the accused receiving payments by instalments from 2018 to 2020 from PW2 and PW14. I had given this some thought as well. [114] To my mind, it was improbable to hold that, since the accused was really a consultant with DW3’s company, he must also have been a consultant with PW2 and PW14. And that he deserved all the payments from PW2 and PW14 for work he had done for them. As I had previously discussed and found, it was far-fetched to hold that the accused was doing the same innocent activities with PW2 and PW14. In any case, there was no written agreement appointing the accused as a consultant for PW2 and PW14. [115] Neither were there any designated payments to him for a certain period of time, as stated in D80 with DW3’s company. Further, there was no evidence that her company was also selling vegetables or hiring illegal foreign workers, in dire need of consultation from the accused. So again, the facts and circumstances were different. How he conducted himself with DW3’s company was not the same as what he did with PW2 and PW14. Hence, I did not accept that the accused raised any reasonable doubt through the evidence of DW3. DW4’s testimony [116] He worked with DW3 at Syakira EJ Enterprises Sdn Bhd as the Managing Director. He was referred to D80, which he signed with the accused. He said the accused’s job was to obtain businesses and customers for his company. [117] As with DW3 before, my opinion was the same: no reasonable doubt could be raised by the accused on the claim that he was a consultant with another company. There was other evidence which told against him, deliberated by this Court and proved by the prosecution, which he was required to answer, namely all the ingredients of the offences that previously were established. [118] Thus, nothing turned in favour of the accused. From DW4’s testimony, I found the accused failed to cast any reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case. DW5’s testimony [119] He said that previously he had worked as an adviser or consultant managing permits for foreign workers. He knew the accused as an immigration officer. Through the accused, he also knew PW14. He applied for permits for PW14’s workers and received payments from him. That was all in his short testimony. [120] So, what was the purpose of calling him to testify? The answer was in the written submission. In its written submission, the defence argued that DW5’s testimony proved that the accused was not involved with protecting PW14, his company or his illegal workers. However, I failed to see how so much of his testimony could have exonerated the accused. Further, the issue here was not so much the accused protecting anyone. [121] As I have elucidated, all the prosecution was required to prove was that the accused, as an officer of a public body, i.e, an immigration officer, forbore to do something in which that public body, i.e, the immigration department, was concerned. Clearly, that was what the law specified in the said penal provision. PW2 and PW14 told him that they were operating their companies by hiring illegal workers, yet he did nothing despite knowing the offence was committed under the immigration laws. What he did then was solicit gratifications from the two men and later received all the bribes from them, supposedly as protection. [122] Again, nothing turned for the accused, and I found that the accused failed to raise any reasonable doubt through the evidence of DW5. DW6’s testimony [123] DW6 was the widow of Dato Jef, who died in 2014. Her husband was a businessman. She and her husband had known the accused since

Through the accused, her husband knew PW2. According to her, PW2 used to ask from her husband and the accused for advice on business matters. The advice sought included the AP for cabbage. DW6 also knew and met PW2’s wife. That was all the salient points in her brief testimony. [124] As far as her testimony was concerned, I accepted her evidence that she was Dato Jef’s wife, her husband was a businessman, and that she knew the accused and PW2. However, I found that there was nothing in her evidence to exculpate the accused by raising any reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case. There was no evidence adduced from her that the accused did not corruptly solicit gratifications, and afterwards, received all the bribes from PW2 and PW14. After all, there was no evidence that she was privy to what had transpired between the accused and both men concerning all the charges. [125] In the circumstances, the accused failed to raise any reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case. Whether the accused managed to rebut the presumption of section 50(1) of the Act on the balance of probabilities. [126] Now, did the accused manage to rebut the presumption of section 50(1) of the Act on the balance of probabilities? It was well settled that this legal burden was heavier than raising a reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case, for him to obtain an acquittal. It was for him to give an innocent explanation which the Court considered more likely than not that it was true, i.e on the balance of probabilities, the test applied in civil proceedings: Thavanathan Balasubramaniam v. Public Prosecutor [1997] 3 CLJ 150 FC. Based on the earlier analysis, I was constrained to find that he failed to rebut the presumption. [127] What, then, will constitute sufficient proof for him to rebut the presumption on the balance of probabilities? The proof must relate to the probabilities of each particular case. Based on the evidence adduced, this court could not find that it was more probable than not that the accused managed to do so. It would be against all probabilities of the case to see that he managed to discharge the burden. Lord Denning in Miller v. Minister of Pensions [1947] 2 All ER 347 said: If the evidence is such that the tribunal can say ‘We think it more probable than not’ the balance is discharged, but if the probabilities are equal, it is not. [128] My other point is this. If he failed in his defence on the lighter burden of raising a reasonable doubt, I did not think he could be found to have successfully rebutted the legal presumption on the heavier burden. This heavier burden could not be discharged through afterthought evidence or bare denials and conjectures. Further, the burden could not be discharged with the presence of unresolved questions and unsupported claims. [129] Section 50(1) of the Act placed an onus on him to discharge his legal burden. A heavier burden was on him to rebut the statutory presumption on the balance of probabilities. The duty was on the accused to prove his defence that he did not commit all the offences. I found that he failed to do so. In Mohd Khir Toyo v. PP [2015] 8 CLJ 796, the Federal Court observed: [105] A presumption stands “unless the contrary is proved”. “The words ‘unless the contrary is proved’ mean that the presumption raised … has to be rebutted by proof and not by mere explanation which may be merely plausible …” (State of Assam v. Krishna Rao (1973) 3 SCC 227 at 237; see also T Shankar Prasad v. State of AP at 766, SN Bose v. State of Bihar [1968] 3 SCR 563 at 571). [Emphasis added] [130] “Proved” is defined in section 3 of Act 56. A fact is said to be “proved’ when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists. [131] Further, the duty to cast a reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case must be distinguished from the duty to prove a defence on the balance of probabilities. The distinction between the two burdens was explained by the Court of Appeal in Abdul Aziz Miew Yiong v. PP [2014] 1 LNS 1875 where Abdul Rahman Sebli JCA (as he then was) opined: In law there is a distinction between the duty to merely cast a reasonable doubt in the prosecution case and the duty to prove a defence on the balance of probabilities. In the former case all that the accused needs to do to entitle him to an acquittal is to cast a reasonable doubt in the trial judge’s mind as to his guilt: Mat v. PP (supra). He has no duty to prove or disprove anything whereas in the latter case affirmative admissible evidence of the facts constituting the defence must be established, failing which he will be convicted of the offence charged. [Emphasis added] [132] Based on the reasons discussed earlier, I found that none of the allegations the accused made in his testimony and written submissions could be accepted as proof of affirmative admissible evidence. The accused failed in his duty to rebut the presumption on the balance of probabilities. Therefore, he failed to rebut the presumption under section 50(1) of the Act. Conclusion at the close of the defence’s case [133] At the conclusion of the trial, this Court found that not only did the accused fail to raise any reasonable doubt in the case for the prosecution, but he also failed to rebut the legal presumption on the balance of probabilities on all the charges. [134] Irrespective of whether a court is otherwise convinced in its own mind of the guilt or innocence of the accused, its decision must be based on the evidence adduced and nothing else: Sia Soon Suan v. Public Prosecutor [1966] 1 MLJ 116. Having considered all the evidence adduced, it was my firm finding that the prosecution had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt against the accused: see section 173(m)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The decision in Miller v. Minister of Pensions (supra) further explained what is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. It was held: That degree is well settled. It need not reach certainty, but it must carry a high degree of probability. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond the shadow of a doubt. The law would fail to protect the community if it admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice. If the evidence is so strong against a man as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour which can be dismissed with the sentence ‘of course it is possible, but not in the least probable’, the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt, but nothing short of that will suffice. [135] Therefore, I found him guilty of the charges for which he was indicted. Accordingly, the accused were convicted on all the charges. The sentence [136] Section 24(1) of the Act reads: Any person who commits an offence under sections 16, 17, 20, 21, 22 and 23 shall on conviction be liable to-

imprisonment for a term not exceeding twenty years; and

a fine of not less than five times the sum or value of the gratification which is the subject matter of the offence, where such gratification is capable of being valued or is of a pecuniary nature, or ten thousand ringgit, whichever is the higher. [137] The provision reflected the Act’s intention to prevent and combat corruption. Be that as it may, it was also crucial that any sentence passed by the Court must be in accordance with the law. A sentence, according to the law, must not only be within the ambit of the punishable section but must also be assessed and passed according to the established judicial principles: PP v. Jafa bin Daud [1981] 1 LNS 26 at page 2. [138] In mitigation, his Counsel asked for a lenient sentence. He had four children and was suspended from his job since 2021. His wife was not working. He was sickly and had a mild stroke, together with diabetes. He also had to support an aged mother. These were the accused’s first criminal convictions, and he pleaded for the Court’s compassion. [139] The prosecution submitted that the offences committed were serious and requested severe sentences for the accused. The sentences should serve as an awareness not just for the accused but also for society. The accused was found guilty after a full trial. As a public servant, the accused had breached the public’s trust. [140] The accused’s plea in mitigation must not be lightly disregarded even after a full trial. It must be considered alongside the public interest as represented by the prosecution. In my view, this was the proper way to strike a balance to decide on the sentence. Having said that, no sentence could be assessed by a simple mathematical formula because many factors had to be taken into consideration based on the facts and circumstances in each case: Mohamed Jusoh bin Abdullah and Another v. Public Prosecutor [1947] 1 LNS 73. [141] I considered that the accused was found guilty after a full trial. Many witnesses had come to testify, and a lot more time was needed for the trial to end. If the accused had pleaded guilty, it would have saved everyone a lot of time. Further, if he had done so and said he was remorseful, then it would have been more convincing than after a full trial if he said he had repented. And he would have deserved a lesser sentence than the one he received in the instant case. However, the accused chose to claim trial as was his right. Be that as it may, I had also factored in the fact that these were his first criminal convictions. [142] To my mind, the accused had committed serious offences. They were not trivial at all. The accused shamelessly took advantage of his office as an immigration officer when asked for his help to obtain permits for illegal foreign workers. A lot has been said about the damaging impacts of corruption, especially if it involves enforcement agencies. What the accused did was a crime that impacted the nation’s safety and security. As such, in my view, the public interest must override the accused’s interest, and a deterrent sentence must necessarily be imposed. [143] Thus, it was my considered opinion that the sentence against the accused was just and appropriate. The sentence was not manifestly excessive on the facts and the circumstances of the case. Dated on this day, 8th December 2025 -sgd- (DATUK AHMAD KAMAL ARIFIN BIN ISMAIL) Judge Sessions Court Johor Bahru For the prosecution : DPP Nurul Qistini binti Qamarul Abrar For the accused : Haji Rosli bin Kamaruddin Mohd Zahier bin Rosli Rosli Kamaruddin & Co.