28J. Admissibility of statements by accused persons

In any trial or inquiry by a court into a criminal offence under this Act or under the laws specified in the Schedule, any statement, whether the statement amounts to a confession or not or is oral or in writing, made at any time, whether before or after the person is charged and whether in the course of an investigation or not and whether or not wholly or partly in answer to questions, by an accused person to or in the hearing of any investigating officer of the

No statement made under subsection (1) shall be admissible or used as provided for in that subsection if the making of the statement appears to the court to have been caused by any inducement, threat or promise having reference to the charge against the person, proceeding from a person in the Authority and sufficient in the opinion of the court to give that person grounds which would appear to him reasonable for supposing that by making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him.

Where any person is arrested or is informed that he may be prosecuted for any criminal offence, he shall be served with a notice

Notwithstanding subsection (3), a statement by any person accused of any offence made before there is time to serve a notice under that subsection shall not be rendered inadmissible in evidence merely by reason of no such notice having been served on him if such notice has been served on him as soon as is reasonably possible after the statement is made.

No statement made by an accused person in answer to a written notice served on him pursuant to subsection (3) shall be construed as a statement caused by any inducement, threat or promise as is described in subsection (2), if it is otherwise voluntary.

Where in any criminal proceedings against a person for an offence, evidence is given that the accused, on being informed that he might be prosecuted for it, failed to mention any such fact, being a fact which in the circumstances existing at the time he could reasonably have been expected to mention when so informed, the court, in determining whether the prosecution has made out a prima facie case against the accused and in determining whether the accused is guilty of the offence charged, may draw such inferences from the failure as appear proper; and the failure may, on the basis of those inferences, be treated as, or as capable of amounting to, corroboration of any evidence given against the accused in relation to which the failure is material.

Nothing in subsection (6) shall in any criminal proceedings—